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The Dispute Resolution Market 
GERHARD WAGNER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the days of 1979 when Landes and Posner 
published their seminal paper on “Adjudication as a Private 
Good,” it has become increasingly common to think of 
adjudication as a service that is offered in markets which 
may be more or less competitive.1 The most obvious 
illustration supporting this view, and one to which Landes 
and Posner referred to explicitly, is, of course, arbitration.2 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, arbitration 
agreements representing the parties’ choice of the tribunal 
that best fits their interests are valid and enforceable.3 
Several arbitral institutions and numerous actual and want-
to-be arbitrators have built their businesses and compete for 
disputes that they can resolve on this legal basis.4  
For a long time, the world of adjudication through public 
courts was based on the opposing principle of “non-ouster.” 
Under this doctrine, not only arbitration agreements,5 but 
also contractual forum selection clauses that re-allocated 
  
† Professor of Law, Humboldt-University at Berlin, Germany, and Professor of 
Fundamentals of Private Law at Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago 
Law School. Thanks to Omri Ben Shahar and Stefan Vogenauer for helpful 
comments.  
 1. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
 2. Id. at 245-53. 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a 
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”). 
 4. See infra Part IV.C. 
 5. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 450-51 (1874); Tobey v. 
Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); Meacham v. 
Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (N.Y. 1914); Gitler v. Russian Co., 
108 N.Y.S. 793, 794 (App. Div. 1908). 
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cases between courts were held to be against public policy 
and were therefore unenforceable.6 The doctrine of non-
ouster had the practical effect that courts were both shielded 
from competition and excluded from participating in it. This 
state of the law changed in 1972 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court embraced the principle of party autonomy regarding 
choice of a judicial forum in the seminal case of M/S Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Company.7 With this decision and others 
that followed,8 freedom of contract, which already governed 
the substantive law, was transposed to the sphere of civil 
procedure. Since another seminal Supreme Court decision 
issued in 1991 in the case of Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 
there is no doubt that forum selection clauses in contracts 
will generally be enforced in American courts, even if they 
are part of boilerplate used in transactions with consumers.9  
Four decades after the Bremen decision was handed 
down, forum selection is once again attracting the interest of 
  
 6. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 451; Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill 
Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678, 679–81 (Mass. 1916); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 
Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 181–83 (1856). For a review of the case law, see James T. 
Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 
KY. L.J. 1, 7-12 (1976); Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational 
System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 422, 427-28 (1991). 
 7. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1972); cf. Gilbert, 
supra note 6, at 24-28. 
 8. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Royal Bed & Spring 
Co. v. Famossul Industria, 906 F.2d 45, 48-53 (1st Cir. 1990); Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. 
v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 373-78 (7th Cir. 1990); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro 
ed Altrigestione, 858 F.2d 905, 912-16 (3rd Cir. 1988).  
 9. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991); cf. Lee 
Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 707-12 (1992); 
Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on 
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553 (1993); 
Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival’s Got the Fun . . . And the Forum: A New Look at 
Choice-Of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine After Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025 (1992); Edward A. Purcell, 
Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and 
the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-
Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51 
(1992). 
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scholars.10 This time, the issue is no longer whether such 
agreements are enforceable, but what the real-world effect of 
freedom of choice has been in the recent past and what it will 
be in the foreseeable future. To what degree have the parties 
availed themselves of their freedom of choice? Did their 
choices affect the distribution of cases between courts? How 
have judges and lawmakers reacted to possible shifts in 
demand for judicial services offered by particular judicial 
systems? In answering these questions, there is a lot to 
discover, as several jurisdictions have deliberately entered 
the competition for disputes.11 The tipping point came when 
the State of New York set up the business court division of 
its court system in order to attract high-profile cases.12 Other 
states have since followed suit, albeit sometimes with less 
success, and competitive forces remain strong to the present 
day.  
Along with all the enthusiasm about interjurisdictional 
competition, another line of analysis exists that seems to 
cover exactly the same ground but from a different 
perspective. On this view, competition between courts is 
tolerable at best but not desirable, as it opens up the space 
for forum shopping. Courts will try to outperform each other 
in becoming ever more plaintiff-friendly. A pertinent example 
is patent litigation.13 In patent litigation, there are a handful 
of districts that attract a disproportionate amount of the 
infringement cases in the country. These so-called “rocket-
docket” courts seem to achieve their success, at least in part, 
  
 10. See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial 
Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 
(2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York]. 
 11. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An 
Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 58 (2011). 
 12. See infra Part IV.D. 
 13. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 11; see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice 
Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 
111, 125–34 (2008). 
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by favoring plaintiffs over the legitimate interests of 
defendants.14  
The question as to how these two worlds—the bright side 
of interjurisdictional competition and the grim version of 
forum shopping—relate to each other is still unexplored. It 
seems that the same phenomenon that is in one instance 
celebrated as promoting procedural efficiency through 
competition between civil justice systems is condemned in 
another for opening the door to strategic choice of forum and 
a resulting degradation of judicial standards. This Article 
makes the claim that the core issue raised by 
interjurisdictional competition for disputes is identical to the 
parallel phenomena of competition for corporate charters and 
for bankruptcy filings. Through a process that has correctly 
been classified as competitive, the state of Delaware 
managed to attract the better part of incorporations in the 
U.S., leading to a dominance of Delaware’s corporate law over 
the corporate laws of all other states.15 Beginning in the 
1990s, a similar development was observed in bankruptcy 
law, where Delaware, together with New York, began to 
outperform other jurisdictions by offering rules and decisions 
more friendly to the bankruptcy bar and the interests of 
current management.16 The case of corporate charter 
business has been examined by extensive literature that 
explicitly draws on the economic concept of competition to 
answer the question whether the so-called “Delaware-effect” 
instigated a race to the top, toward an optimal corporate law, 
or rather instigated a race to the bottom, i.e. a corporate law 
  
 14. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 11. 
 15. For discussions, compare ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW (1993), and Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of 
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985), with Lucian Bebchuk et 
al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1775 (2002), and Lucian Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1168 (1999). 
 16. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 49-76, 124-28, 137-38 (2005) [hereinafter 
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE]; Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, 
Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2007). 
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that benefits managers at the expense of shareholders.17 
Professor LoPucki has eloquently raised the proposition that, 
in the bankruptcy context, competition for cases is a bad 
thing and should prompt a response, but this proposition has 
never triggered a nearly as thorough and broad debate for 
corporate law.18 With respect to the choice between different 
systems of dispute resolution, however, the topic has been 
ignored altogether. 
The present Article fills this void. It brings the two topics 
of interjurisdictional competition and forum shopping 
together and asks whether one hypothesis or the other 
provides a more adequate account of reality. With regard to 
decisions that choose from a menu of mechanisms of dispute 
resolution, it is essential to draw a distinction between 
unilateral and bilateral choice. In one instance, the choice is 
made unilaterally by one party only—typically the plaintiff—
while in the other, the choice is made together by the consent 
of both parties. It will be argued that this feature, whether 
the forum is selected by only one party or by both disputants, 
makes all the difference. In essence, unilateral choice, 
inevitable as it may be, is something the legal system needs 
to worry about and should take care to limit and rein in. In 
contrast, bilateral choices made by both parties deserve to be 
given full deference. Consensual choice of forum not only 
implements the preferences of the parties, but also 
stimulates a competitive process of constant improvement of 
dispute resolution processes.  
Before exploring the distinction between unilateral and 
bilateral choice in more detail, it is helpful to clarify the 
concept of competition as applied to adjudication and judicial 
dispute resolution. Part I of the Article identifies the core of 
the concept of competition that was developed with a view to 
private markets for goods and services, not for governmental 
  
 17. For the proposition of a race to the bottom, see William L. Cary, Federalism 
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 664-66 (1974). 
For the opposing view opposing view of a race to the top, see Ralph K. Winter, 
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977). For more nuanced discussions, see the sources cited 
supra note 15.  
 18. See sources cited supra note 16. But see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 343 (2006). 
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functions such as judicial dispute resolution by public courts 
that are charged with enforcing the law. Nonetheless, 
competition has been outgrowing these narrow confines and 
has developed into an economic concept that is able to 
capture a broader range of human activities, including the 
adjudication of disputes. It is therefore legitimate to speak of 
a market for adjudication and of judicial dispute resolution 
as a product. 
Part II identifies the demand side and the supply side of 
the dispute resolution market and introduces the basic 
distinction between unilateral and bilateral competition. As 
will be shown, this distinction is not a conceptual idea that is 
tied to a particular legal or economic theory that may be 
accepted or rejected for one reason or another, but rather the 
distinction presents itself a feature ingrained in the structure 
of real-world disputes.  
The Article then hones in on unilateral competition. Part 
III supplies an in-depth analysis of the mechanics and effects 
of unilateral forum choice. At a theoretical level, it explores 
the plaintiff’s considerations in making the decision to file 
suit in one court rather than another. It then confronts the 
theoretical model with reality and examines the evidence 
that supports the existence of unilateral competition. As will 
be explained in more detail below, it is justified to assume 
that some courts, to a degree at least, respond to the demand 
of plaintiffs for a friendly court, thus setting off a process that 
may adequately be described as competitive. Part III 
concludes in posing the ultimate normative question of 
whether unilateral competition is a good or bad thing. And 
the answer is clear: unrestrained unilateral competition sets 
off a race to the bottom in the sense of a depreciation of the 
procedural standards necessary for the accurate enforcement 
of the law. For this reason, courts and lawmakers are well 
advised to curtail unilateral competition as best they can. 
Part IV of the Article explores another world, namely the 
one of bilateral choice, in which the parties agree to have 
their dispute litigated or arbitrated in a particular court or 
arbitral tribunal. This world can exist only because the 
disputants, in spite of all the antagonism between them, 
harbor a set of shared interests that they draw on when they 
agree on the choice of a court or tribunal. The essential point 
2014] THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MARKET 1091 
here is that parties making a consensual choice in favor of a 
particular court seek to optimize the accurate enforcement of 
their bargain, i.e. of the commercial contract that later turns 
into the subject matter of their dispute. Courts intending to 
be responsive to this kind of bilateral demand voiced by both 
parties together must therefore offer processes that promise 
a high degree of accuracy coupled with low costs of dispute 
resolution, in other words, a process that optimizes its 
benefits and its costs. While it would be too strong a claim to 
suggest that judges mimic the behavior of suppliers catering 
to a private market for services, there is evidence from some 
jurisdictions that courts and lawmakers, often stimulated by 
the local bar, pulled together in order to make their systems 
more “attractive” to potential litigants. The analysis of 
bilateral competition concludes with posing the same 
normative question that was used to evaluate unilateral 
forum choice, i.e. whether consensual forum choice is 
desirable. The answer is straightforward and affirmative. 
Inasmuch as parties strive to balance the benefits and costs 
of dispute resolution, they help to optimize the incentives to 
comply with the terms of their bargain. To the extent that 
courts respond to this type of demand, a process of constant 
improvement of mechanisms of dispute resolution is set off 
that may adequately be described as a race to the top.  
The optimistic conclusion of Part IV (that bilateral 
competition is desirable as a means of improving the quality 
of judicial services) is clouded by some caveats and 
qualifications that are the focus of Part V. One such caveat 
results from network effects. Parties seem to make the choice 
for a particular forum not in isolation, but in conjunction with 
the choice of the applicable substantive law. The substantive 
law and the judicial services of a particular jurisdiction are 
“sold” as a package, and these packages become all the more 
attractive as the number of users increases. The results are 
first-mover and lock-in effects: jurisdictions that used to be 
among the most attractive in the past may be able to defend 
their position over their competitors, notwithstanding the 
inferior quality of the services they offer today.  
Another serious problem is caused by the principal-agent 
relationship existing between uninformed parties and their 
1092 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62  
attorneys.19 In most cases, at least, clients are unable to make 
informed choices between courts and thus have to rely on the 
advice of lawyers. The resulting agency relationship creates 
room for the attorney-agent to exploit the lack of information 
on the part of the principal-client for his or her own gain by 
advising the client to file suit in a court that is not in the 
client’s best interest but is beneficial to the attorney. Finally, 
unfettered competition in the market of adjudication, even if 
it is stimulated by bilateral choices, may lead to negative 
externalities between jurisdictions.20 The “acquiring” 
jurisdiction may be forced to use public funds to subsidize the 
judicial resolution of disputes that arose in another 
jurisdiction, while the “ceding” jurisdiction loses control over 
the enforcement of its laws. Together, these effects suggest 
that competition in the area of dispute resolution services 
will never be perfect and possibly should not even try to be.  
The Article concludes with the question of whether states 
may be able to compete on both levels, i.e. in the area 
dominated by unilateral choice, as well as in the market for 
consensual forum selection. Surprisingly, the answer may be 
in the affirmative. The key is to bifurcate the court structure 
and to offer a specialized division of the judiciary to litigants 
who are jointly looking for the most efficient mechanism to 
enforce their bargain. The remaining courts of general 
jurisdiction may then be left to compete in the market of 
unilateral forum choice by adapting their rules and 
procedures in an effort to attract more claims.  
I.  COMPETITION BETWEEN CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS? 
A. The Concept of Competition, as Applied to Dispute 
Resolution 
In economics, “competition” is not merely a descriptive 
concept but also a normative one, denoting something 
positive and desirable. The first fundamental theorem of 
welfare economics asserts that a market with perfect 
  
 19. See infra Part V.B. 
 20. See infra Part V.C. 
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competition yields Pareto-optimal outcomes.21 Perfect 
competition is characterized by large numbers of small firms 
competing for customers in markets to which free access is 
guaranteed. Each supplier must take the price as given as he 
is too small to affect it with his own supply so that price 
equals marginal cost, and profits are zero.22  
These conditions are obviously not satisfied in the 
market for judicial services, to which access is regulated, 
where the number of suppliers is limited, where market 
participants are working on fixed salaries, and where 
valuable services may be offered for a price significantly 
below cost. On the other hand, it would be too easy to discard 
the notion of competition of judicial systems altogether. The 
existence of competition in the market for judicial services 
was particularly obvious in the days of Adam Smith, who 
wrote in his The Wealth of Nations: 
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support 
of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavored 
to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that 
account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not 
originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. . . . In consequence 
of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon 
the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause 
tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and 
impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The 
present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England 
was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this 
emulation which anciently took place between their respective 
judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the 
speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for 
every sort of injustice.23 
  
 21. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics 2-3 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3641, 1991). 
 22. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 149 (19th ed. 
2010). 
 23. 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 208 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1960) 
(1776). As to the details of this system of judicial remuneration and its 
consequences for the development of the common law, see Daniel Klerman, 
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1179 (2007). 
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 In his standard elaboration of the concept of competition, 
George Stigler defines competition as “a rivalry between 
individuals (or groups or nations) [that] arises whenever two 
or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain.”24 
He added that “a concept that is applicable to two cobblers or 
a thousand ship owners or to tribes and nations is necessarily 
loosely drawn.”25 On the basis of his broad definition, the 
existence of competition in the market of legal services is 
obvious: courts, arbitral institutions, arbitrators, and 
mediators compete for cases, disputants compete for 
competent decision-makers, and plaintiffs compete for the 
forum most sympathetic to their claims. Alas, one might be 
confident that the “invisible hand” of competition leads to 
optimal outcomes that cannot be improved without lowering 
someone’s utility.26  
The question explored in this Article is: does it really 
work this way with regard to civil justice systems? The 
analysis to follow is not limited to civil justice systems in the 
technical sense of the term, i.e. public officials vested with 
the powers of government, sitting in public courts, and 
deciding cases under rules of law. While the choice between 
systems of judicial dispute resolution remains at the core, the 
market for judicial services cannot be analyzed without 
regard to the numerous offerings of “alternative”—meaning 
non-judicial—methods of dispute resolution. As private 
  
 24. George J. Stigler, Competition, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 51, 51 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 25. Id. 
 26. 1 SMITH, supra note 23, at 13 (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but 
a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. 
Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed 
people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though 
this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has 
occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for 
them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner 
as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money 
which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another 
bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for 
lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or 
lodging, as he has occasion.”). 
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parties offering alternative dispute resolution services 
operate in private markets, they must be accounted for in a 
meaningful analysis of competition between judicial systems. 
The real market to analyze is not the market for judicial 
services but, more broadly, the market for dispute resolution 
services. That includes not only the settling of disputes via 
arbitration, but also the many varieties of alternative dispute 
resolution, such as expert proceedings, conciliation, 
mediation, etc. The parties to a dispute are confronted with 
a rich menu of options, ranging from simple face-to-face 
negotiations to highly stylized litigation in public court. 
These options are never perfect substitutes for one another, 
and some of them are not substitutes at all, as they may be 
combined to form a multi-layered mechanism of dispute 
resolution. Many disputes start out with negotiations 
between the parties that may then lead to mediation, and 
from there to arbitration, in order to reach the courts after 
the award was made and an application for leave to enforce 
was filed.  
The fact that the different products available on the 
market for dispute resolution services may be substitutes for 
one another but may also be combined complicates the 
analysis.27 The presentation to follow will not explore the 
various tools and mechanisms of alternative dispute 
resolution in detail, but will focus on solely judicial 
disposition of disputes and arbitration instead. In doing so, 
arbitration is understood to be close to a perfect substitute 
for judicial resolution of disputes. 
B. The Tiebout Model of Systems Competition 
The basic concepts of welfare economics have been 
applied to rivaling governments and countries, building on 
the Tiebout model of competition for the supply of public 
goods.28 Within this framework, people and businesses shop 
  
 27. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-19 (1995). 
 28. For the original discussion of this model, see the pathbreaking piece by 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). For an application of the ideas of systems’ competition to the legal field, 
see Anthony Ogus, The Economic Approach: Competition between Legal Systems, 
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around for the jurisdiction or community whose mix of 
benefits and burdens best meets their preferences.29 Local 
governments are sellers of public goods to citizens and 
businesses, and they charge a price for the bundle of goods 
offered in the form of taxes levied on their customers. On the 
demand side, firms and citizens pick the combination of taxes 
and public goods that best satisfy their preferences. This 
drives lawmakers and regulators to improve the mix of taxes 
and public goods they offer in order to attract new citizens 
and firms. This process continues up to the point where local 
governments approach their optimal composition and size.30 
Over time, competition weeds out those governments that do 
a poor job, i.e. those which charge excessive taxes compared 
to the poor quality of public goods they can offer.  
C. Systems Competition in Dispute Resolution 
Tiebout’s conclusions are based on the assumption, that 
he made explicitly, that consumer-voters are fully mobile and 
will move to the community that best satisfies their 
preferences.31 However, this assumption is completely 
unrealistic, particularly in the international context where 
linguistic, cultural, and institutional differences make 
movements from one country to another complicated and 
fraught with high transaction costs.32 With regard to the 
market for dispute resolution services, however, the 
assumption that the switch from one jurisdiction to another 
  
in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 155, 155-67 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 
2007); see also Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
405 (1999). For a modern treatment, see Hans-Werner Sinn, The New Systems 
Competition 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8747, 2002). 
 29. Tiebout, supra note 28, at 418 (“[T]he consumer-voter moves to that 
community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”).  
 30. Id. at 419 (“[C]ommunities below the optimum size seek to attract new 
residents to lower average costs. Those above optimum size do just the opposite. 
Those at an optimum try to keep their populations constant.”). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Cf. Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, Federalism, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 661, 673-74 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 
2000). 
2014] THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MARKET 1097 
can be made at low cost may actually be valid. The choice of 
a particular court or other dispute resolution mechanism 
does not force citizens to physically leave their jurisdiction in 
order to relocate elsewhere. Rather, similar to the case of 
choice of law, firms and consumers may make “virtual” 
choices, i.e. opt in favor of a mechanism of dispute resolution 
without changing their permanent affiliation with a 
particular jurisdiction and its system of civil justice.33 The 
disputants are therefore able to import dispute resolution 
services by opting in favor of one system of civil justice or 
arbitral dispute resolution rather than another.  
The analogy to choice of law is not complete, however, 
because processes of dispute resolution normally necessitate 
the physical presence of the disputants or their 
representatives at a single location, e.g., the court. In this 
sense, there is still an element of “voting with one’s feet” 
involved. The burden associated with such travel 
requirements is far from the one attached to moving one’s 
residence or seat to another jurisdiction. Still, as we shall see, 
the costs of “moving” to another jurisdiction temporarily in 
order to use mechanisms of dispute resolution there play a 
role in the calculus of the parties when they make the 
relevant choices.34  
Another assumption made in Tiebout’s model 
analogizing competition in private markets with competition 
between jurisdictions is that there are no spill-overs between 
jurisdictions, i.e. “no external economies or diseconomies 
between communities.”35 The hypothesis that the competitive 
behavior of the various jurisdictions does not cause effects 
outside the respective community is realistic with regard to 
the resolution of a dispute between the parties involved. 
However, dispute resolution is not the only good produced by 
civil justice systems. Another function of the court system is 
to clarify and amplify the law, to develop it into new areas, 
and to change existing rules where this turns out to be 
  
 33. For a full exploration of this argument, see Gerhard Wagner, The 
Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
995, 1007-11 (2002). 
 34. See infra Part III.D.1.  
 35. Tiebout, supra note 28, at 419. 
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necessary.36 To the extent that competition in the litigation 
market shifts demand from one jurisdiction to another, the 
number of cases and court decisions in the ceding jurisdiction 
declines, and the amplification and rule-making functions of 
the courts suffer. These consequences raise serious issues 
that need to be addressed once the dynamics of systems 
competition in the litigation market have been explored.37  
II.  THE MARKET FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES  
A. The Supply Side of the Market for Dispute Resolution  
Assuming that the product traded in the litigation 
market is dispute resolution, it is essential to identify 
demand and supply. Who demands what from whom as a 
supplier? Subject to the above qualification, that mediation 
and other supplemental forms of alternative dispute 
resolution are ignored,38 the supply side of the market for 
dispute resolution consists of courts and arbitrators who 
compete for business in the form of cases brought to them for 
the purpose of decision-making. 
B. The Demand for Dispute Resolution 
1. The Distinction Between Unilateral and Bilateral 
Demand 
If courts and arbitrators form the supply side of the 
market for dispute resolution, who is on the demand side? 
The question is worth asking because, per definition, a 
dispute requires at least two parties. The presence of several 
parties on one side of the supply-and-demand relation may 
be unproblematic, as long as the interests of the parties are 
well aligned with each other. This is not true in the case of a 
dispute, as the interests of the parties there are antagonistic 
by their very nature. In fact, both parties are competing 
against each other for a favorable outcome of the dispute 
  
 36. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, Civil Procedure: General, in 5 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 32, at 16; Landes & Posner, 
supra note 1, at 236. 
 37. See infra Part V.C. 
 38. See supra Part I.A. 
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resolution process. In the familiar case of a money claim, 
everything the plaintiff wins, the defendant loses, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, it would be wrong to think that the 
interests of the disputants are fully antagonistic, as there 
will be areas of overlapping concerns. Most importantly, both 
parties will want to limit the costs of whatever dispute 
resolution mechanism they choose.  
The distinction between shared and antagonistic 
interests of potential litigants maps onto two different types 
of demand for dispute resolution services. In the case of 
unilateral demand, only one party, typically the plaintiff, 
acts upon her preferences, while in the other category of 
bilateral demand, both parties have to fit their preferences 
together in order to make a joint decision in favor of a court 
or other dispute resolution mechanism. As they have to agree 
on how to make that choice, their demand is bilateral.  
Generally, the choice between several competent courts 
or, more broadly, civil justice systems is for the plaintiff to 
make. Absent an agreement of the parties creating an 
obligation to use arbitration rather than litigation, and 
without a forum selection clause vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction in a particular court, the potential plaintiff has 
the privilege of making a unilateral choice. The default rule 
in civil procedure provides that, absent valid agreements 
made by the parties, the plaintiff has the authority to pick 
the court that will hear and decide the case. In this type of 
situation, the demand side of the market for dispute 
resolution services is populated by potential plaintiffs only.  
The case of bilateral demand is analogous to the case, 
familiar from the substantive law of contract, that the parties 
deviate from default rules. Today, most legal systems allow 
the parties to derogate from the general law of civil procedure 
in various ways, even though no jurisdiction has gone as far 
as to enforce derogative agreements across the board.39 In 
particular, the parties are authorized to vest an arbitral 
tribunal or a public court with exclusive jurisdiction, 
derogating the jurisdiction of all other courts that would have 
  
 39. Cf. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 8-13 
(Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323056.  
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been competent otherwise.40 In this type of situation, the 
choice is made by the disputants together, as both sides have 
to agree to use one court rather than another. Even so, the 
interests of the parties in the outcome of the dispute 
resolution process remain antagonistic; the agreement 
extends only to the person or institution that serves as the 
decision-maker and to the nature of the dispute-resolution 
process.  
2. Ex Ante and Ex Post Agreements  
It is tempting to link the distinction between unilateral 
and bilateral choices to the other distinction between ex ante 
and ex post agreements on dispute resolution. Where the 
parties are in a contractual relationship with one another, 
there is the option of agreeing on the competent court ex ante, 
before a dispute has arisen. In practice, the parties regularly 
include in their commercial contracts forum selection or 
arbitration clauses fixing the mode and place of dispute 
resolution. Obviously, transaction costs are much lower in 
this situation than in the state ex post. In the situation ex 
ante, the parties sit together anyway and negotiate their 
commercial contract. The forum selection or arbitration 
clause is just one element in a set of contested issues that the 
parties must settle in order to close the deal. The fact that 
the parties have to resolve a multitude of issues makes it 
easier to compromise on any one of them, as it is possible to 
compensate a “loss” here with a “gain” there. Even more 
importantly, in the situation ex ante, the facts and 
circumstances of the dispute that will arise in the future are 
still unknown. Neither party can anticipate whether he or 
she will find himself or herself in the role of the plaintiff or 
that of the defendant;41 whether he or she will have a stronger 
interest in confidentiality or in full disclosure; whether it will 
be important to him or her to enforce the judgment in a 
particular jurisdiction, or to resist enforcement in another, 
etc. To borrow a term from John Rawls, the parties negotiate 
behind a veil of ignorance because they are unable to know 
  
 40. See sources cited supra notes 7-9.  
 41. This Article assumes a female plaintiff and a male defendant. 
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their position as plaintiff or defendant, the strengths and 
weaknesses of their claims or defenses, or their collateral 
interests in the litigation that might arise in the future.42 
This makes it easier to reach an agreement. 
Private ordering ex ante is only possible where the 
parties have been in a relationship, contractual or otherwise, 
before the dispute arose. Where there was no contract or 
other legal relationship prior to the dispute, as is true in most 
cases involving torts and similar claims, the parties may still 
agree on a dispute resolution mechanism ex post. In this 
situation, the veil of ignorance regarding the nature of the 
dispute has been lifted, the roles as plaintiff or defendant 
have become clear, the stakes are obvious, the parties are in 
a bilateral monopoly because the only potential contracting 
partner is the opponent, and they need to agree on a single 
issue: the court or tribunal in which to litigate or arbitrate 
the dispute. While such agreements are possible and do occur 
in the real world, they are difficult to negotiate and involve 
high transaction costs.43  
In most instances, unilateral choice of the dispute 
resolution mechanism will involve claims of non-contractual 
nature, and bilateral choice will concern claims that have 
grown out of contractual relationships. However, the fit 
between the categories is not perfect. Even parties who were 
in a contractual relationship with one another, but failed to 
agree on a dispute resolution clause ex ante, always retain 
the option to come together ex post and fix jurisdiction with 
a particular court or arbitral tribunal with regard to a 
dispute that has already arisen. 
C. Two Types of Competition 
The distinction between the two types of demand— 
unilateral demand and bilateral demand—is central to an 
  
 42. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1971). 
 43. See Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility 
of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
313, 322 (2003) (reporting the finding of his survey that less than 10% of AAA 
arbitrations involving disputes between businesses were the result of post-
dispute agreements). 
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analysis of competition in the market for dispute resolution, 
even though it is mostly ignored in the literature.44 From a 
descriptive as well as a normative point of view, the outcome 
reached in a competitive process is contingent upon the input 
in terms of preferences. To take an example from an 
unrelated area: if consumers have a preference for high-
powered cars, the supply side of the automobile market will 
accommodate such preferences, and more cars with the 
appropriate features will be sold. From a dynamic 
perspective, more resources will be channeled into 
researching and developing high-powered cars, and a whole 
industry may be led onto this path. If, on the other hand, 
consumers had a strong preference for fuel efficiency, then 
demand would favor other types of cars, the automakers 
would compete to match this kind of demand, and, in the long 
term, resources would be channeled into research for more 
fuel-efficient cars. Over time, one group of consumers may 
shift from one preference towards the other and back, as has 
happened in the U.S. several times in response to major 
changes in oil prices.  
In the same manner, the competitive process will yield 
different outcomes, depending on whether plaintiffs alone or 
both parties together represent the demand side. Where 
plaintiffs have the demand side to themselves, only their 
preferences count, and the supply side, e.g., courts and 
arbitrators, will compete to meet these preferences and 
nobody else’s. If, on the other hand, both parties share in the 
demand side, they will articulate only those preferences that 
they share, and these will be different from any one party’s 
preferences. Again, the supply side in the market for dispute 
resolution services will react to the articulated preferences of 
actors on the demand side, and the competitive process will 
be shaped accordingly. As we shall see, both categories of 
competition exist in the real world, generating different 
outcomes and prompting different concerns.  
  
 44. It is laudable that some authors dealing with issues of competition between 
justice systems make it clear that they only talk about bilateral competition. See, 
e.g., Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 10, at 6 (“[W]e limit our focus to 
litigation in which all parties consent to employing the foreign court.”); see also 
id. at 15. 
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III.  UNILATERAL COMPETITION FOR A FRIENDLY COURT 
A. The Options and Why They Matter 
Where there is no choice between courts or between 
judicial and arbitral dispute resolution, there can be no 
competition. In a world without arbitration and with clear 
and straight jurisdictional rules that vest jurisdiction for a 
given case in one court only, plaintiffs would have to live with 
whatever court was competent. Yet, in reality, the reverse is 
true, as plaintiffs have a choice between multiple courts that 
are competent to hear and decide their case, in addition to 
the option to shun the court system altogether and turn to 
arbitration.  
Within the U.S., the range of options available to a 
plaintiff is particularly broad, thanks to the federal structure 
of the nation and the double-tiered judicial system it 
maintains. As a consequence, the case that only one forum is 
competent to hear and decide a particular dispute is not the 
rule, but a rare exception, and the choice between the several 
courts that have jurisdiction may well be outcome-
determinative. Each state within the Union operates its own 
court system, its own choice of law rules, and distinct systems 
of tort and contract law. The legal rules allocating 
jurisdiction are largely left to the states, as long as basic 
constitutional guarantees are observed.45 In addition to the 
judicial systems of the several states, there is a federal 
system with its own courts and rules of jurisdiction. Even 
though a federal court is bound to apply the same choice of 
law rules46 and the same substantive law as the state court of 
the state in which the federal court is located,47 outcomes 
might still be different, depending on whether a case is 
brought in state court or in federal court.  
B. The Plaintiff’s Calculus 
Rational and self-interested claimants make the decision 
of where to file suit with a view towards maximizing their 
  
 45. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 46. E.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 47. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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chances of winning and minimizing the costs they are 
expected to bear. The immediate costs of using the court 
system are the fees charged by the court plus the fees charged 
by legal counsel for representation in the forum in question. 
Both items together represent the administrative costs (ca) of 
using the court’s services. To the extent that they must be 
borne by the plaintiff, they are the plaintiff’s expected 
administrative costs (cpa). This item is understood to be 
independent of the design of the cost allocation rule enforced 
by an individual court. Within the domain of the American 
rule, cpa represents the filing fee to be paid by the plaintiff 
plus the sum of attorney’s fees the plaintiff expects to invest 
in the litigation. Within jurisdictions following the English 
rule on cost allocation, cpa denotes the expected share of the 
costs that the court will allocate to the plaintiff.  
The calculations a rational plaintiff would make in order 
to select the optimal court are a simple extension of expected 
value analysis. Let the probability that plaintiff ultimately 
wins a favorable judgment be p, the amount of damages 
awarded be X, and the administrative costs she is expected 
to bear be cpa; then the plaintiff will bring suit whenever pX 
− cpa > 0.48  
In a situation where the plaintiff has a range of options 
of where to file suit, and provided that the several courts 
competent to try the case differ in their treatment of the case 
and in the probability that the plaintiff will ultimately 
prevail, the calculus needs to be applied with respect to each 
competent court. In a scenario with two courts, Court 1 and 
Court 2, the plaintiff would need to estimate her chances of 
prevailing in Court 1 and in Court 2 (p1 and p2), estimate the 
damages that are likely to be awarded by the two courts (X1 
and X2), and the amount of legal costs she is likely to have to 
bear following suit in either forum (cpa1 and cpa2). The 
estimated value of litigation in Court 1 would be p1X1 − cpa1 
and the estimated value of litigation in Court 2 would be 
equal to p2X2 − cpa2. The plaintiff would file in Court 1 if the 
expected value of litigation there would be greater than the 
expected value of litigation in Court 2: p1X1 − cpa1 > p2X2 − 
  
 48. For a thorough treatment, see Kathrin E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 259, 264-65 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007).  
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cpa2. In the reverse case, when p2X2 − cpa2 > p1X1 − cpa1, the 
plaintiff would turn to Court 2. In theory, these same 
calculations could be run with any number of courts that 
compete for jurisdiction.  
It needs to be mentioned that rational plaintiffs would 
have no interest in maximizing the expected value of the 
judgment as such.49 What plaintiffs really care about is the 
sum of money that they can ultimately recover from the 
defendant. In order to be able to do so, it is crucial to select a 
court whose judgments carry a high chance of actual 
recovery. While forum selection can do nothing to make 
defendants richer than they really are, the law of execution 
may vary between jurisdictions and the ability to enforce a 
judgment abroad may also differ from country to country. 
Therefore, rational plaintiffs would select the court with a 
view of maximizing the likelihood of actual recovery of any 
sum awarded from the defendant, minus costs.  
C. Additional Variables 
1. Delay 
The conventional model outlined above fails to include a 
number of variables that are relevant in making the choice 
between suing in one court rather than another. One such 
item is the cost of delay. Inevitably, dispute resolution takes 
time, but the amount of time it takes to reach a final decision 
or other resolution of a dispute varies from mechanism to 
mechanism and from court to court. In the familiar case of a 
claim for money, the losses incurred by the plaintiff while 
waiting for a decision enforcing her claim are at least equal 
to foregone interest that could have been earned from an 
early investment of the money. Plaintiffs, whose financial 
structure includes debt that could have been repaid by using 
the proceeds from the claim, incur damages equal to the 
interest payments that they have to make on the respective 
amount of their outstanding debt. Where large sums are 
involved, an unresolved dispute may block certain options of 
corporate restructuring, such as a merger with another 
company. In extreme cases, plaintiffs may even face 
  
 49. For a more thorough discussion, see infra Part IV.A.2. 
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insolvency due to the long delay in resolving disputes around 
claims of high value. Such losses caused by the delay of 
dispute resolution may be offset by awards of pre-judgment 
interest and rights to damages, but their availability and 
scope depends on the jurisdiction and on the substantive law 
chosen by the parties.50 Even where these remedies are 
available, they tend to be under-compensatory, especially 
where the stakes are high. If the net costs of delay are 
denoted cd, rational plaintiffs would choose between different 
courts by comparing p1X1 − cpa1 − cpd1 with p2X2 − cpa2 − cpd2. 
2. Collateral Harm 
Another important concern relates to the benefits and 
the harms generated by the process of dispute resolution 
itself, regardless of the outcome and the costs it takes to 
achieve it. The existing literature acknowledges the fact that 
litigation may have “external effects” that need to be 
evaluated and included in the plaintiff’s calculus.51 These 
authors focus on the effects the decision in a single case may 
have on the resolution of future cases between the same 
litigants.  
One example relates to the familiar situation where the 
defendant faces a large number of suits that are all based on 
the same fact pattern. Such a scenario is standard in 
products liability cases involving design defects. If the design 
of a mass-produced commodity has been found to be defective 
by a respected court in a single case, the defense in all the 
other cases becomes much more difficult to sustain. After the 
highest-ranking court of the relevant jurisdiction has found 
the product to be defective, litigation in the mass of cases still 
pending at lower levels is practically over. In such a setting, 
the defendant’s stakes in the first case that comes up for 
decision greatly exceed the value of the subject matter in 
dispute between the two parties to this lawsuit. An adverse 
judgment in one particular case would have large negative 
  
 50. Cf. William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York 
City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413, 421-22 (1990) (comparing the rate of 
prejudgment interest available from courts in New York with the market rates, 
which were substantially higher).  
 51. See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 36, at 9-12. 
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external effects for the defendant and yield corresponding 
gains for all the other actual and potential plaintiffs who 
were injured by the same kind of product. Of course, the 
reverse case, where the additional loss affects a single 
plaintiff, while the gains accrue to a multitude of defendants, 
is conceivable too.  
Gains and losses to the disputants may also be caused by 
the procedure itself, regardless of its effects on other similar 
cases. The most obvious example involves the disclosure of 
confidential information. A party might have an interest not 
to disclose certain facts in open court, even if this forum may 
lean in her direction and the disclosure would increase her 
chances of prevailing. Plaintiffs are well advised to consider 
this aspect while making the choice between different courts 
and tribunals, as the selection of a process that allows for 
broad discovery will increase the willingness of the defendant 
to agree to a generous settlement. 
The harms or benefits caused by the process of dispute 
resolution as such, in ways other than increasing or 
decreasing the chances of persuading the decision-maker, are 
“collateral” to the litigation or arbitration. The threat of 
inflicting collateral harm on the opponent may be used as 
leverage in settlement negotiations, increasing the chances 
of winning a generous payment. But even if settlement is not 
the issue, collateral harms and benefits are clearly relevant. 
A celebrity might avoid courts of a jurisdiction simply 
because of the intensive media attention that must be 
expected if trial is held there.  
In a complete model of the plaintiff’s decision on where 
to file suit, the collateral harms and benefits would have to 
be reflected and expressed in variables. This is not without 
difficulty, however, as the complex and diverse collateral 
effects of litigation in a particular forum need to be identified 
and their strengths estimated. The resulting variable would 
have to be a compound of at least two subcategories of 
external effects: 
1. The expected gain a favorable resolution of the dispute 
has on other similar claims of the plaintiff, both those already 
pending or to be brought in the future, and vice versa for an 
outcome that is adverse to the plaintiff’s interests. 
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2. The expected gains from a procedure that imposes 
collateral harm on the defendant, and thus increases his 
willingness to settle and the amount he is prepared to agree 
in settlement, minus any losses the procedure may force on 
the plaintiff. 
In order to avoid the complexities associated with such 
estimations, the net value of collateral harms and benefits, 
as perceived by the plaintiff ex ante, shall be captured in the 
variable Z, which represents the aggregate of collateral costs 
and benefits, and may therefore be positive or negative.  
The aggregate of these variables must be added to the 
expected value of litigation in one court or another, so that 
the plaintiff compares p1X1 − cpa1 − cpd1 + Zp1 with p2X2 − cp2 − 
cpd2 + Zp2 and will file suit in Court 2 if p2X2 − cp2 − cpd2 + Zp2 
> p1X1 − cp1 − cpd1 + Zp1. 
D. Evidence of Unilateral Competition 
Up to this point, the analysis was purely theoretical, 
exploring the concerns and considerations of a rational 
plaintiff who is faced with a menu of courts and tribunals to 
choose from. The upshot was that plaintiffs try to maximize 
the difference between the expected judgment and the sum of 
administrative costs, costs of delay, and collateral effects. 
The question now is whether there is evidence suggesting 
that this is an adequate description of the decision-making 
process real-world plaintiffs go through. 
1. Hometown Bias 
In reality, most plaintiffs do not engage in extensive 
expected value analysis but form intuitions about the most 
favorable courts and then compare the expected value of 
litigation in the two or three most promising venues. In doing 
so, plaintiffs will reason from the assumption that the court 
spatially closest to them—their “home court”—will be the 
easiest one to persuade. Litigation in one’s home court offers 
palpable advantages that work to increase the chance of 
prevailing. In many cases, the plaintiff will retain counsel 
practicing in the same jurisdiction, so that litigating “at 
home” obviates the need to retain another or additional 
counsel for representation elsewhere. For the plaintiff’s 
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officers and employees, it is clearly more convenient to 
litigate at the seat of the company than in a far-away place. 
The plaintiff’s evidence may be located close to its own 
residence or seat, so that it is easier and safer to present it 
there. Finally, the local judges, even if not biased against 
foreign defendants, may at least see to it that they do not 
prejudice local plaintiffs.  
By the same measure that these concerns work to the 
advantage of the plaintiff, they tend to disfavor the 
defendant; he may have to deal with a judiciary biased 
against his interests, he needs to seek out, instruct, and pay 
counsel at a distant locale, his officers and employees will 
have to travel to a distant court if so required, and the 
defendant’s evidence must be shipped there, at his own cost 
and risk. These factors taken together suggest that litigating 
“at home” is the best option available because it maximizes 
the net expected outcome for the plaintiff. 
These considerations regarding the calculus a 
hypothetical plaintiff will go through in making the decision 
of where to file a lawsuit are confirmed by the historical 
development of American law and empirical evidence 
gathered from the legal landscape of the United States. In 
fact, the concern for local bias of the state courts was the 
major motivation for the introduction of diversity jurisdiction 
of the federal courts in cases involving matters of state law 
only under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.52 
The canonical explanation goes back to John Marshall: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will 
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties 
of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself 
either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such 
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it 
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies 
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different 
states.53 
  
 52. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 
HARV. L. REV. 483, 492-97 (1928). 
 53. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) 
(Marshall, C.J.); see also Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 
(1945). 
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An additional concern that led the framers was their 
belief that the federal courts were more sympathetic to, and 
supportive of, land owners and large commercial enterprises 
operating across state lines.54  
The hometown bias is difficult to confirm empirically. 
With regard to international litigation involving foreign 
parties in American courts, empirical studies have yielded 
opposing results, with one study suggesting that foreign 
parties fare worse than domestic ones55 while other studies 
found that their win rates were actually higher than the one 
of domestic parties.56 However, even the authors of these 
optimistic studies were cautious to add that “we never said 
or implied that anti-foreign bias is nonexistent.”57 Rather, 
they maintained that case selection was driving the results, 
as foreign parties who fear the bias of local courts will be 
more willing to settle and litigate to trial only the strongest 
cases.58 As long as the strength of this effect remains in the 
unknown, it seems impossible to draw strong conclusions 
from empirical findings. In contrast, the perception of the 
lawyers who are representing parties in litigation 
unequivocally confirms the existence of hometown bias. 
Contemporaneous surveys of practitioners reveal that the 
preferences for, or the aversions against, local biases are 
strong factors in the making of forum selection decisions. 
Even though local bias loomed larger for defense attorneys 
than for plaintiffs’ attorneys, 44.9% of the members of the 
plaintiffs’ bar who had responded to a survey still confessed 
that local bias was a major factor in their decision-making.59 
  
 54. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 27 (1948). 
 55. Kimberley A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1497, 1503-06, 1509-14 (2003). 
 56. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in 
U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 441, 443 (2007) 
[hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia]; Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1120, 1124-25 (1996).  
 57. Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia, supra note 56, at 445. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Removal Cases under Diversity and 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 400, 408-09 (1992) (“50.7% 
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Interestingly, the only other factor with an even stronger 
impact on the forum selection decision was reported to be 
“attorney convenience”60—a point worth coming back to when 
examining the effects the principal-agent-relationship 
between client and attorney has on such decisions.61  
2.  Forum Shopping  
In most cases involving corporate defendants, the range 
of courts where suit may be brought is much wider than a 
mere choice between state and federal courts, however, as 
corporations that operate nationwide are subject to the 
jurisdiction of each and every state within the Union. Given 
that the state courts, as well as the federal district courts, 
apply the procedural law and the choice of law rules of the 
state in which they sit,62 there is much to gain from having 
one court rather than another hear and decide a case. Local 
choice of law rules tend to favor the application of local 
substantive law, so that forum selection is a mere conduit for 
a choice of the substantive law. This framework provides 
members of the plaintiffs’ bar representing groups of victims 
who were harmed in different states with the chance of 
exploiting the differences between the local regimes in a 
broad variety of jurisdictions and to file suit under the tort 
law that offers the most favorable combination in terms of 
liability, damages, and procedure.63 Even though this option 
has been narrowed down by the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, it remains intact with regard to the choice between the 
  
of the responding defense attorneys said that bias against out-of-state litigants 
was present in their cases. . . . [A] number of plaintiff counsel agreed that there 
is bias against out-of-state defendants. Interestingly, this perception of bias is one 
of the few factors which correlates closely with plaintiff counsel’s legal experience, 
measured by year of bar admission.”). 
 60. See id. at 400-03. 
 61. See infra Part V.B. 
 62. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 63. This is true in spite of the limits on choice of law imposed by Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See Carol Rice Andrews, The 
Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate about “Class 
Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1320-25 (2005). 
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federal district courts and with regard to claims for less than 
$5 million.64  
The combination of the three principles of (1) diversity 
between the legal regimes of the several states, with (2) 
jurisdictional equality of all the courts in the nation, and (3) 
allocation of the right to choose the competent court to the 
plaintiff, generates a pro-plaintiff bias. This effect has been 
confirmed by empirical studies. Clermont and Eisenberg 
have found a strong pro-plaintiff effect if cases are tried in 
the forum of the plaintiff’s choice, rather than in another one 
to which the case was transferred.65 One of their studies 
focused on cases initially filed in a federal district court, with 
one group being tried in the court where the original suit was 
filed, while another one was transferred to another forum 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). While the plaintiff’s win rate was 
58% in the court where the suit originated, it was only 29% 
in the courts to which the case was transferred. The authors 
conclude that “venue is worth fighting over because outcome 
often turns on forum.”66 The same effect was discovered in 
another study that compared the win rates for plaintiffs in 
state courts and the win rates in cases that had originated in 
state court but had later been removed to the federal courts 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. While the win rates for plaintiffs in 
cases decided by state courts is around 71%, it drops to 33% 
in cases that originated in a state court system, but were then 
moved to a federal court.67 Even though part of the 
  
 64. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Action Fairness Act: Aggregation and Its 
Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1910-22 (2006); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1595-97 (2006); Sarah S. 
Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 
1620 (2006); Thomas E. Willing & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of 
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 591 (2006) (discussing empirical data regarding the choice of forum 
decisions made by plaintiffs’ attorneys in class actions before and after CAFA). 
 65. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of 
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-13 (1995). 
 66. Id. at 1508. 
 67. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really 
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998). While the original data used by the authors 
compare win rates in federal courts only, the win rate for plaintiffs in suits filed 
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explanation for these differences is the selection effect—the 
set of cases that remain in the court where they were filed is 
different from the ones that were removed and/or transferred 
—the conclusion that forum matters still holds.68 Apart from 
the selection effect, other factors are at work: judicial bias, 
familiarity and convenience, the rules of procedure, the 
applicable choice of law, and the contents of the substantive 
law.69 It is part of the professional duty of plaintiff’s counsel 
to exploit the variation between different courts by filing 
where the likelihood of winning is the highest, or more 
precisely, where the expected value of the claim is 
maximized.70  
E. The Supply Side to Unilateral Competition 
The supply side of the market for unilateral choice of 
court is populated by the judges and lawmakers in the 
jurisdictions that compete for exercising authority over the 
case at hand. Their incentives will be explored in more detail 
below.71 In the present context, it is sufficient to point to 
anecdotal evidence that supports the proposition that judges 
and lawmakers in some, certainly not all, jurisdictions are in 
the business of attracting claims, particularly in the area of 
personal injury litigation.  
This seems to be true for so-called “hellhole 
jurisdictions,” primarily located in the south-east, along the 
coast of the Gulf of Mexico, where courts are said to be more 
or less strongly biased against corporate defendants, 
particularly in personal injury suits.72 The motives of the 
  
in federal courts is roughly the same as the one in suits filed and decided in state 
court. Id. at 596. 
 68. Id. at 596-99. 
 69. Id. at 599-600. 
 70. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 122-25 (2002). 
 71. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 72. See Stephan Wilske & Todd J. Fox, The So-Called ‘Judicial Hellholes’ in 
US Jurisdictions and Possible Means to Avoid Them, 2 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 235, 
235, 239-40 (2008); AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION (ATRF), JUDICIAL 
HELLHOLES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.judicialhellholes.org. 
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courts and lawmakers in these jurisdictions are not entirely 
clear. However, there are allegations that the objective of 
benefiting the local plaintiffs’ bar at the expense of out-of-
state corporate defendants plays a role, particularly in states 
where judges are elected by the general population and must 
rely on donations for their electoral campaigns.73 Because 
local practitioners are the prime contributors to campaigns 
for judicial office, they represent the constituency of the 
judges. Given that local attorneys derive a substantial share 
of their revenues from contingency fees earned in lawsuits 
brought against out-of-state corporations it is not 
unimaginable that the local judiciary is responsive to its 
interest in generous standards for attributing liability and 
awarding damages. With a view to the State of Mississippi a 
federal judge of the Fifth Circuit noted explicitly that “its 
courts have become a Mecca for plaintiffs’ claims against out-
of-state businesses.”74 
Such characterizations are not uncontroversial as 
commentators have criticized the surveys underlying the 
reports on judicial hellholes as seriously flawed.75 For present 
purposes, it is not necessary to take sides in this controversy, 
as it suffices to find variation between the courts of different 
jurisdictions, together with evidence suggesting that the 
differences are not a matter of happenstance but of deliberate 
actions of decision-makers. As to the first point of variation 
  
 73. See the statement of Judge Richard Neely of West Virginia in RICHARD 
NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE 
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988) (“The anarchy that currently prevails among 
American state jurisdictions absolutely guarantees politically that no line of any 
sort will be drawn. After all, I’m not the only appellate judge who wants to sleep 
at night. As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state 
companies to in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep 
enhanced when I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security, 
because the in-state plaintiffs, their families and their friends will reelect me.”). 
 74. Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 75. See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: 
Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 983-
85 (2009); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1093, at 1103-05 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916-17 (2011); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know 
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System–and Why Not?, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992). 
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between courts, there is no reasonable doubt that there are 
“magnet” jurisdictions attracting a disproportionate number 
of personal injury suits in general, and of large, aggregated 
cases in particular. The reason for the gravitational pull 
exerted by these jurisdictions must be that the expected 
judgment for plaintiffs is higher than elsewhere.76 This is 
confirmed by a recent survey of blockbuster punitive 
damages awards, i.e. awards exceeding $100 million in 
nominal dollars. The study found that 41 of the 99 highest 
punitive damages awards in history were awarded by courts 
in just two states—California and Texas—while New York’s 
courts rendered only 2 such awards.77 For each citizen, the 
average amount of such blockbuster awards in 2008 dollars 
was $136 in New York, $629 in Texas and $1,429 in 
California.78  
For obvious reasons, the motives of judges sitting in such 
magnet jurisdictions are difficult to investigate. A famous 
member of the plaintiffs’ bar in Mississippi characterized his 
state as a “magic jurisdiction” where the judiciary was 
elected with “verdict money” so that it was almost impossible 
for out-of-state defendants to get a fair trial.79 This suggests 
that the motive behind plaintiff-friendly decisions may really 
  
 76. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come 
to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 190 (2009) (“The post-Shutts [Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)] world, however, allowed each local jurisdiction 
to test its experimental regime not within its geographic boundaries, but 
wherever similarly situated claimants might happen to be found. Once we add 
differences in local rules governing aggregation, different legal cultures across the 
range of potential jurisdictions, the possibility of untoward influence with locally 
elected judges in some locales, and a range of other such experimental variables, 
the potential for strategic manipulation of forum becomes ever present. The 
results were repeated criticisms, some no doubt well founded, of certain choice 
places being a ‘magnet forum’ or, less benignly, a ‘judicial hellhole’ for the 
ensnared defendant.”). 
 77. Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of 
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 130 (2010). 
 78. Id. 
 79. The citation is ascribed to Richard Scruggs, in The Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America, Asbestos for Lunch 5, (June 11, 2002), cited in Mark A. Behrens & Cary 
Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation of Mississippi’s Legal 
Climate, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005); see also Benjamin Reid et al., Tobacco 
Lawyers’ Roundtable: A Report from the Front Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545 
(2001). 
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be the desire to attract claims. But even if this were 
otherwise, the suggestion that a demand side responsive to 
the plaintiffs’ interests does exist may still hold water. Even 
if every single judge is solely motivated by the honest motive 
to apply the law, the perception as to what the law says and 
requires will differ between judges. The motive of plaintiff-
friendly judges to further the interests of victims, for 
example, may lead to judgments that are indistinguishable 
from outcomes reached by judges who act on the desire to 
attract claims. For a competitive process to unfold, it does not 
matter what the underlying motive is as long as courts differ 
systematically in their attitudes towards plaintiffs so that 
one court consistently performs better in the eyes of plaintiffs 
than another. Competition for a plaintiff-friendly court will 
develop where there is variance between the courts and 
jurisdictions.  
F. Is Unilateral Competition Desirable? 
Even though the striving of plaintiffs for the court most 
conducive to their cause may be couched in the terms of 
competition, it is not the kind of competition economists 
envisage for an efficient economy and society, as it does not 
maximize social welfare. From a normative point of view, 
unilateral competition is a failure because the interplay of 
supply and demand does not promote social welfare. The 
outcome cannot be otherwise as the private welfare function 
of the plaintiff is different from the social welfare function. 
While plaintiffs care about the prospect of winning, the social 
welfare function is based not on the number of successful 
suits but on optimal enforcement of the incentive structure 
created by the substantive law of contract or by the parties 
in their agreements.80 Where the good to be maximized is the 
number of successful suits brought, competition will force 
courts and lawmakers to treat plaintiffs ever more favorably. 
A court that would just rubber-stamp the suits filed, and 
award judgment for plaintiff without any further ado, would 
be the most desirable because it produced the most output at 
the least cost.  
  
 80. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
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Within the realm of dispute resolution, the pursuit of 
plaintiff’s self-interest does not, through the working of the 
invisible hand, promote social welfare, but rather sets off a 
race to the bottom.81 The general presumption that pursuit of 
individualistic goals furthers the common good does not hold 
where the counterpart at the other end of the transaction 
fails do to the same and is willing instead to accommodate 
the first parties’ interests at the expense of third parties. This 
is exactly what is happening in the realm of unilateral 
competition for judicial services; plaintiffs want to win, 
courts that are friendly to their interests follow suit, and the 
balance must be paid by defendants who, in the extreme, are 
being denied their right to a fair trial.  
This general feature that renders unilateral competition 
for judicial services undesirable may be present in other 
areas of legal administration as well. With regard to the 
competition of states for corporate charters, it is a matter of 
some dispute whether that race is headed towards the bottom 
or rather to the top, i.e. competition for a corporate law that 
helps to maximize social welfare.82 This is a valid question to 
ask, as the decision to incorporate or reincorporate in one 
state rather than another is often not made by the owners of 
the corporation but by the management. To the extent that 
the interests of managers differ from those of the 
shareholders, competition for corporate charters may lead to 
suboptimal outcomes. However, this discussion cannot be 
taken up in the present context, as there are major factors 
working to rein in unilateral competition in the market for 
corporate charters, such as the involvement of the SEC and 
the control of management by shareholders and capital 
markets. Such controls are absent from the market for 
judicial services.  
The closest real-world analogy to unilateral competition 
in the market for dispute resolution may be the competition 
of firms for the most favorable bankruptcy forum. Here, too, 
it has been argued that allowing corporations to choose the 
bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization has 
  
 81. See sources cited supra note 17.  
 82. See supra note 15 and accompanying sources. 
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corrupted the bankruptcy system to the benefit of those who 
make these choices, i.e. the incumbent management of 
insolvent companies.83 The race to the bottom competition 
that resulted from unilateral choice of the bankruptcy forum 
has favored those courts that adopted a passive attitude, 
rubber-stamping management’s proposals regarding asset 
sales, critical vendor lists, and prepackaged plans.84  
IV.  BILATERAL COMPETITION FOR OPTIMAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
As we have seen, in a model of unilateral forum choice, 
the incentives faced by the plaintiff will lead her to choose 
the court where her chances of prevailing and of securing a 
high award are maximized and the expected costs of dispute 
resolution to be borne by the plaintiff are minimized.85 
Bilateral competition will lead to different outcomes because 
the interests and incentives of both parties, rather than only 
the plaintiff’s, enter the equation.  
A. The Demand Side: Shared Interests of the Parties 
What are the incentives that lead the parties in making 
their choice between one court and another in the situation 
ex ante? Given that a plaintiff wants to maximize the 
expected payoff from litigation, one might be tempted to 
think that the parties will want to maximize their joint profit 
from litigation, in terms of maximizing the size of the award. 
This proposition is wrong. It implies that the parties seek to 
reap the benefit of their bargain in the form of sums awarded 
in court judgments rendered down the road, after a dispute 
has arisen and has been resolved through litigation. Because 
litigation is a zero-sum game that causes costs, delay and 
collateral harm, maximizing the number of disputes does not 
maximize the parties’ joint surplus from their contract but 
rather harms their interests. 
  
 83. See supra note 16 and accompanying sources. 
 84. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 16, at 137 (citing attorney M. 
Blake Cleary of the firm Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor).  
 85. E.g., supra Part III.B. 
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1. Accurate Enforcement—Efficient Predispute 
Behavior 
In the situation ex ante, it is in the interest of both 
parties to maximize the joint benefit from their contract. In 
an ideal world, the parties would write a completely specified 
contract that covers every contingency and set up an 
incentive scheme that induces behavior that maximizes the 
joint surplus.86 The same could be achieved by limiting 
express contractual language to specific issues only and to 
rely on default rules for the rest—provided that these default 
rules promoted efficient solutions. Under the assumption 
that the parties’ contract or any composite of contract 
provisions and default rules generates incentives which 
induce behavior that maximizes the pie, and therefore leads 
to an efficient allocation of resources, the proper function of 
the courts is to enforce the parties’ bargain. An efficient 
contract will only lead to efficient behavior if breaches of 
contract are sanctioned by a court imposing the proper 
remedy, e.g. expectation damages.87 The court provides the 
enforcement mechanism that makes the incentives set up by 
contract or by law sharp. In absence of this enforcement 
mechanism, the parties would have no legal incentive to 
comply with the obligations they assumed under the 
contract. They would resort to self-help remedies, which 
must be costlier than the civil justice system as otherwise the 
parties would use them anyway. 
While it is obvious that false negatives, i.e. the rejection 
of valid claims for damages based on breach of contract, 
undermine the incentives to perform rather than breach, the 
same has been shown to be true for false positives. If a court 
grants a claim for damages even though the defendant was 
not in breach, incentives to perform will be weakened, not 
  
 86. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 292, 339-41 
(2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS]. 
 87. Even though matters are far more complicated, expectation damages are 
the proper remedy for breach of contract in many standard cases. See id. at 304-
09. 
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strengthened.88 For a party facing the decision to perform or 
breach, the crucial yardstick is not the absolute probability 
of being held liable in case of breach, but the difference 
between the expected sanction in case of breach and the 
expected sanction in case of performance. If a court awarded 
damages for breach of contract randomly, i.e. with a 
probability of 0.5 regardless of whether there really was a 
breach, the expected sanction would not influence the parties’ 
behavior at all. Because it would not make a difference in 
court whether the promisor performed or breached, she 
would have no financial incentive not to breach where her 
private gain exceeded her private costs.  
In a similar vein, one could imagine that efficient 
enforcement of contractual obligations requires a court to 
award damages for breach of contract in the largest 
conceivable amount. Such a view is mistaken as well. 
Damages in excess of expectation damages, for example, 
undermine the incentives the expectation damages remedy is 
designed to generate.89 A court that awarded damages 
greater than losses would create incentives to perform on a 
contract even where it would be more efficient not to do so, 
as the costs of performance incurred by the promisor would 
exceed the harm suffered by the promisee in case of breach. 
As much as the parties who negotiate a contract have no 
reason to increase the damage measure beyond expectation 
damages, there is no reason for them to pick a court that is 
likely to impose a supra-compensatory remedy.  
Rational parties to a contract are interested in putting 
into practice the incentive scheme established in their 
contract, i.e. induce behavior such as delivery of the goods 
and performance of the services that were promised, 
payment of the price, etc., where this is the efficient thing to 
do. They have no interest in anything more or less. 
  
 88. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic 
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 348 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1994). 
 89. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150-55 (8th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of 
Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 
284-86 (1970); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL 
J. ECON., 466, 470-72, 487 (1980). 
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Consequently, the dispute resolution mechanism of their 
choice would enforce the provisions of their bargain and of 
efficient default rules accurately. In doing so, it would deter 
inefficient behavior and create incentives to maximize the 
joint gains from the contract. Therefore, the demand of the 
parties in the situation ex ante is for an accurate court or 
tribunal. Disregarding costs for the moment, this means a 
court that allows only valid claims in the amount warranted 
and rejects all invalid claims. 
The answer to the question as to what the parties 
maximize when they negotiate a forum selection or 
arbitration clause ex ante is therefore straightforward: they 
maximize the gains from trade in the form of inducements to 
comply with efficient terms in their contract.90 Other than in 
the situation ex post, the behavior of the parties, e.g., the 
decision whether to take precautions that make performance 
more likely or not to do so and instead prepare for breach, is 
not a fact of the past, but involves options for future actions. 
The court or tribunal chosen by the parties defines the payoff 
that will be derived from the choice of one of these options, 
e.g. breaching the contract, by imposing a monetary sanction.  
It is essential to bear in mind that the gains from 
enforcement of efficient contracts, in the form identified 
above, may only be reaped in the course of the execution of 
the contract and before a dispute has even arisen. Once the 
act that the contract was designed to deter has been 
committed, e.g. once the promise to perform has been broken, 
accuracy becomes irrelevant for the parties. Of course, the 
judgment of the competent decision-maker affects the 
distribution of wealth between the parties, which explains 
why they compete for the court most favorable to their 
interests.91 However, any gains from efficient pre-dispute 
behavior have already been lost. In case the promisor expects 
  
 90. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 745-47 (2001) [hereinafter Drahozal, Unfair Clauses]; Keith 
N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 
8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 218-19 (2000); Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social 
Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986); Steven Shavell, The Social 
Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 333 (1982). 
 91. See supra Part III.B.D. 
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to get away in court even though his decision to breach the 
contract was opportunistic, i.e. performance would have been 
the course of action maximizing the pie, he will commit the 
breach. After the contract has been breached 
opportunistically, the losses incurred as a consequence 
thereof are sunk costs that cannot be avoided or retrieved by 
an accurate decision ex post. In the world ex post, accurate 
decisions are important only as guideposts for future parties, 
similarly situated, who are informed about the sanction to be 
expected in case of opportunistic breach.92 For the parties to 
the present dispute, this positive externality remains 
irrelevant. However, in the world ex ante, when the present 
disputants agreed on the court or tribunal competent to hear 
and decide disputes of the future, they were able to anticipate 
the size of the possible sanction and the probability that it 
will be imposed in case—and only in case—of an 
opportunistic breach. Therefore, any gains from an optimal 
decision-making process that may accrue to the present 
disputants are predicated on the assumption that the parties, 
at the time of contracting, know about the level of accuracy 
supplied by the decision-maker of their choice.93 It is only 
then that they are in a position to reap the benefits of 
accuracy in the form of better incentives to take care and to 
facilitate performance. 
Achieving the goal of accurate enforcement of contractual 
agreements is not a one-way street where the parties focus 
on the substantive provisions first and then turn to the 
dispute resolution clause in order to identify the court best 
able to enforce their bargain. The two issues of contract 
drafting and enforcement are intertwined since better 
drafting may reduce the demands for the courts that are 
called upon to enforce the contract when a dispute arises in 
the future.94 If the parties were able to write an unequivocal 
contract that no reasonable decision-maker could ever 
  
 92. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 93. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 2. 
 94. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of 
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 517, 523-24 (2008); Robert E. Scott & 
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814, 
817-18, 830 (2006). 
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misconstrue, their only concern would be to avoid a corrupt 
court. In reality, however, it is impossible to draft complete 
and unequivocal contracts, which is another way of saying 
that drafting complete contracts would involve transaction 
costs that would outweigh the gains made from completeness 
in the form of benefits from added accuracy. Thus, the parties 
need to balance the investments made in more accurate 
contract drafting against the costs of dispute resolution to be 
expected down the road. The higher the costs of drafting more 
precise contract language and the lower the costs of accurate 
judicial enforcement, the more the parties will want to rely 
on the judicial process rather than run up transaction costs 
in the process of negotiating their contract.  
2.  Enforcement of Judgments 
The concern of rational contract parties is not with 
accurate decisions as such, in the form of a nicely reasoned 
document created by a court.95 In reality, the dispute may be 
far from over after judgment has been rendered. This is not 
because appeals may be available, as appellate procedures 
are meant to enhance accuracy given a certain budget of 
administrative funds and resources.96 Sure enough, the 
common interest in accuracy must be targeted at the final 
judgment in a given case with the design and performance of 
the appeals process taken into account.  
From the perspective of the parties ex ante, the gains 
from accuracy are based on incentives to behave properly, e.g. 
to render performance rather than to breach a contract where 
this is the efficient course of conduct. In order to provide the 
appropriate incentives to do so, the promisor must be 
confronted with a credible sanction. In case of breach, a 
credible sanction requires not only that the court would 
recognize it as such—and award the remedies stipulated in 
the contract or supplied by legal default rules —but also that, 
in cases where the losing defendant does not comply 
voluntarily, the judgment will be enforced against him by the 
competent authorities. Only if the defendant can be certain 
  
 95. But cf. supra note 88 and accompanying sources. 
 96. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 
J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995) [hereinafter Shavell, Error Correction]. 
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that, in the case of non-performance, a court will hold him in 
breach, award expectation damages to the plaintiff, and 
collect by force the sum awarded plus costs and interest, does 
the defendant face the right incentives to make the decision 
to either perform or breach.  
Assuming by way of illustration that the expectation 
interest of the plaintiff-promisee is 100 and the costs of 
performance to the promisor are 90, efficiency requires that 
the contract be performed. The defendant-promisor will do so 
if he can be certain that, in case of non-performance, the court 
will accurately hold him in breach of contract, enter a 
judgment in the amount of 100, and force him to pay this sum 
to the plaintiff in the course of execution. However, if the 
probability for the plaintiff-promisor to prevail in a suit for 
breach of contract was only 85%, the expected judgment 
would be worth 85, which is less than the cost of performance. 
As a consequence, the defendant has no incentive to perform 
instead of committing breach, even though breach is not 
desirable from a social point of view. The same inefficient 
result would be obtained if the court ruled accurately on the 
merits and awarded damages in the amount of 100, but 
where the probability of recovery in execution was only 85%.  
In well-organized jurisdictions, execution of judgments is 
assured so that the only concern about collectability is 
whether the defendant is solvent, i.e. has assets sufficient to 
cover the sum awarded in judgment. The choice of venue or 
the one between arbitration and litigation can do very little 
about judgment-proof defendants, even though the effects of 
asset limitations on incentives to take care and not to breach 
contracts are serious and well known.97 This is different in 
the international context, where picking the right court may 
pave the way towards full recovery in execution, while a 
favorable judgment rendered by the “wrong” forum may 
prove to be worthless. This is why practitioners specialized 
in international litigation select the forum with a view to 
making recovery in execution more likely. The same concern 
explains why arbitration is so successful in the market for 
resolution of international disputes: arbitral awards enjoy a 
  
 97. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 
45-46, 54 (1986). 
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privilege over court judgments when it comes to recognition 
and enforcement abroad. Only arbitral awards are subject to 
the uniform regime of the New York Convention of 1958,98 
while the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a 
foreign court remains in the discretion of the lawmakers and 
judges in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.  
During the last decade, efforts were made to remedy this 
situation under the purview of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law. The goal was to supplement the 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards by a sister convention, which would 
govern jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.99 Due to deep differences in opinion 
between the governments of the U.S. and Europe on how to 
allocate personal jurisdiction in the international arena, this 
attempt failed rather spectacularly. The final outcome was 
not a proposal for a convention covering the two topics of 
jurisdiction and enforcement, but rather a narrow 
instrument dealing with forum selection clauses only.100 The 
effort made at the Hague Convention provides evidence of 
how large issues of enforcement and collectability loom in 
international transactions. The Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Clauses at least provides the parties with a device 
to fix jurisdiction by agreement and to safeguard 
enforcement of judgments rendered by the court of their 
choice. In doing so, it places litigation based on consensual 
forum selection on an equal footing with arbitration that is 
based on agreements to arbitrate. This helps to stimulate 
bilateral competition for the best system of dispute resolution 
across the litigation/arbitration divide.  
  
 98. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
 99. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International 
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can 
the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 193-94, 200 (2001); 
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A 
New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 271-73 
(1994); CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1997), 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf.  
 100. See Andrea Schulz, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Clauses, 
12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433 (2006).  
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3. The Tradeoff Between Accuracy and Costs 
It would be wrong to think that rational parties would be 
interested in maximizing the accuracy of outcomes in 
litigation. Looking back at the variables that determine the 
unilateral decisions made by plaintiffs, the administrative 
costs of dispute resolution remain a concern here as well. 
However, while the plaintiff, when acting unilaterally, only 
cares about the expected cost to her, the parties together 
share the interest to limit and minimize the joint cost of 
litigation.  
There is a tradeoff between accuracy and costs in the 
sense that accuracy is increased when greater resources are 
spent on litigation.101 Thus, the efficient outcome involves an 
exercise in balancing the gains from accuracy against its 
costs. One way to formulate the rule is that the parties should 
choose the dispute resolution mechanism that maximizes the 
difference between deterrence benefits and dispute 
resolution costs.102 It makes no difference, but is easier to put 
into mathematical terms, to turn the calculus around and to 
target the minimization of the sum of administrative and 
error costs: min cja + c(e).103 It is essential to bear in mind that, 
other than in the case of administrative costs, the costs of 
error (c(e)) are incurred not in the course of litigation or 
thereafter but ex ante, before a dispute arises.104 The costs of 
error come in the currency of distorted incentives to behave 
efficiently, i.e. to comply with an efficient rule or contractual 
provision.  
As in the case of unilateral competition, an analysis 
focusing only on the administrative costs of dispute 
resolution is too narrow. In addition to these, the loss to the 
plaintiff caused by the delay in dispute resolution and any 
collateral harm incurred by both parties in the course of the 
  
 101. See Hylton, supra note 90, at 213; Kaplow, supra note 88, at 348-54; Spier, 
supra note 48, at 283. 
 102. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation 
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 
550 (2003). 
 103. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 417 (5th ed. 2008). 
 104. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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process must be taken into account. Applying the 
nomenclature used above, the complete formula would read: 
min c(e) + cja + cjd + Zj.105 In the real world, the parties will not 
strive to devise the forum that minimizes the outcome of this 
formula, but rather compare one court to another in order to 
identify the superior forum, i.e. the one that performs better 
in balancing accuracy and costs. Given a choice between 
Court 1 and Court 2, the parties will prefer Court 1 if c(e1) + 
cja1 + cjd1 + Zj1 < c(e2) + cj2 + cjd2 + Zj2 and vice versa.  
The objective to minimize the sum of error costs, 
administrative costs, costs of delay, and collateral harm will 
lead rational parties to make a joint and reasoned choice 
between different courts or other mechanisms of dispute 
resolution. It is just another way of maximizing the pie, one 
where the pie allows for the possibility of disputes and 
therefore includes the costs of dispute resolution.  
4. Alignment of the Private and the Social Interest 
Disregarding externalities,106 parties maximizing the 
contractual pie maximize social welfare at the same time. 
Therefore, the same calculus can be applied by the courts: a 
court should increase its efforts for accuracy up to the point 
where the cost of a marginal increase in administrative 
expenses is equal to the benefits in terms of the gains from 
more efficient performance of contractual obligations. 
Because the benefits associated with more accurate 
enforcement of the law depend on the foreseeability of the 
court’s ultimate decision for the parties ex ante, they will 
vary with context. Where the gain from more accurate 
adjudication is small or even non-existent, as may be the case 
with quantum issues where parties are only able to foresee 
average harm, the court should refrain from investing its 
  
 105. It must be borne in mind that Z captures not only collateral harm but also 
collateral gain, as outlined above in Part III. C. 2., and may therefore be either 
positive or negative. Should the aggregation of collateral costs and collateral 
benefits represented in Z lead to a negative value (meaning that in total a 
collateral gain is given) the formula must read: min c(e) + cja + cjd − Zj.  
 106. See infra Part V.C. 
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resources in order to achieve a higher level of accuracy.107 
B. The Supply Side: Incentives of Judges, Lawmakers, and 
Arbitrators 
In the previous section, it has been pointed out that there 
is a demand for an optimal court in the sense of a dispute 
resolution mechanism that maximizes the difference between 
the gains from more efficient behavior due to the threat of 
accurate enforcement of efficient rules and agreements, and 
the administrative and collateral costs of whatever dispute 
resolution mechanism the parties chose. The analysis now 
turns to the supply side of the market. The fact that there is 
a demand for an optimal court would remain inconsequential 
if it did not meet a supply side that was responsive to this 
demand. 
1. The Price of Judicial Services  
An initial problem with framing the choice between 
courts in parallel to a transaction in an ordinary services 
market is that a market price for judicial services does not 
exist. Judicial services are not priced in proportion to cost so 
that supply and demand can never reach a competitive 
equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Courts typically 
charge only nominal fees for their services that fall far short 
of covering the full costs of the civil justice system. The larger 
share of these costs is shouldered by the government and 
ultimately by the taxpayer as the funder of public 
infrastructure. Regardless of the absolute level of the fees 
charged, no court sets its fees in proportion to the amount of 
judicial sweat that goes into resolving a particular claim. 
Fees are not even meant to serve as an equivalent or at least 
an approximation of market prices.  
2. Judges’ Incentives 
The shape and outcomes of competition in the market for 
judicial services depends on the behavior of the judges, which 
  
 107. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of 
Damages, 39 J. L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (demonstrating that accuracy in the 
calculation of damages may not be worthwhile in many settings). 
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in turn is a function of their incentives. While the processes 
for the selection of judges vary greatly across jurisdictions, 
no jurisdiction subjects judges to selection by the potential 
disputants, i.e. by the firms and individuals who have become 
their “clients.” Once judges have been appointed, they are not 
paid in proportion to the effort they invest in a given case, let 
alone that their income reflected whether they did a good or 
a poor job on the cases assigned to them. Other than in the 
days of Adam Smith, who described the English courts of the 
18th century,108 judges are no longer paid out of the fees paid 
into their court by the litigants. Rather, they operate within 
a framework of constitutional and administrative law that 
insulates them from the forces of the market. In such an 
environment, judges do not have a financial incentive to 
increase demand for their services. Therefore, it is 
unwarranted to characterize their practice as one of “selling” 
the service of dispute resolution in a competitive market. 
However, in a more modest way that does not aim for 
allocative efficiency through the operation of perfectly 
competitive markets, it remains legitimate to think of the 
judiciary as forming the supply side in a market for dispute 
resolution services. Even though judges have no financial 
motive to provide work of high quality, they care about both 
popularity and prestige. They want to be respected for their 
abilities by the public at large and by their peer groups 
including fellow judges and members of the bar.109 This 
incentive is particularly strong in jurisdictions where judges 
are recruited from the ranks of the bar. In these jurisdictions, 
the peer group of judges continues to be their former 
colleagues. In England, for instance, the newly appointed 
judges remain members of the barrister chambers in which 
they had been working with their colleagues before their calls 
to the bench. These judges will be concerned about the 
reputation they continue to enjoy among their former 
  
 108. See 1 SMITH, supra note 23. 
 109. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. 
CHOICE 107, 129 (1983); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices 
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13-
15 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, Judges and Justices]; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK 35-40 (2008).  
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brothers-in-arms. These non-pecuniary goals do entice judges 
to work much harder than they would have to in order keep 
their offices. In addition, judges have an incentive to avoid 
the reversal of their decisions by appellate courts, if only 
because they enjoy the power to decide what is wrong and 
what is right.110  
More detailed findings would depend on a thorough 
exploration of the incentive structure faced by judges, and 
they would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in 
accordance with the variance in procedures for judicial 
appointments, rules on tenure and salary, working hours, 
promotion, independence, etc. As a general proposition it still 
seems plausible to assume that judges have an interest in 
deciding challenging and important cases, and in doing this 
in a way that supports a good reputation among their peers. 
In a loose sense, therefore, there is competition between 
individual judges as well as between courts and jurisdictions.  
3. Lawmakers’ Incentives  
Judges are not the only actors on the supply side of the 
market for dispute resolution. Lawmakers are another group 
whose actions and omissions bear on the quality of dispute 
resolution services available in a given jurisdiction. 
Consciously or not, judges and legislators are working 
together to define the product of judicial dispute resolution 
as it is offered in a particular locale. In many jurisdictions, 
the fees charged by courts for the filing and processing of 
claims are set not by the judiciary, but by the legislature. 
Often, the legislature also enacts the rules of procedure and 
determines the size and the organization of the judiciary. In 
some jurisdictions, legislative committees vote judges into 
office so that the legislature also determines the composition 
of the judiciary. It is obvious that these decisions bear heavily 
on the performance of the court system.111  
A complete picture of the market for judicial services 
therefore has to include the members of the legislature and 
would need to analyze their incentives. This is easier said 
than done as it requires an exploration into the incentive 
  
 110. See Posner, Judges and Justices, supra note 109, at 15-23.  
 111. See supra Part III.E. 
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structure of individual members of the legislature, the 
aggregation of these incentives into a majority position, a 
model explaining the interaction of the legislative majority 
with the executive branch, and finally an idea of how the 
executive branch forms preferences and acts upon them. 
While it is impossible to develop a theory of legislative 
behavior in the present context,112 it remains possible to 
explore reasonable hypotheses with regard to the subject 
matter under consideration. The pivotal question is whether 
lawmakers have an interest in making their jurisdiction 
attractive to those parties who are considering it as the 
jurisdiction of their choice.  
The answer is in the affirmative. Even without assuming 
any preferences regarding the substance of the legal rules in 
force in a given jurisdiction, lawmakers will take an interest 
in the enforcement of whichever rules they put in place. Law 
enforcement, in the sense of applying the law made by the 
legislature to the facts they were meant to govern, is foremost 
the business of the courts. Quite obviously, the domestic 
courts offer the greatest assurance that the domestic law will 
be applied properly. This explains the tendency of states and 
countries to extend the jurisdiction of their courts as far as 
possible through long-arm statutes or other tools.113  
In addition, lawmakers take an interest in the well-being 
of the local bar. Either de facto or de jure, lawyers are 
restricted to a single jurisdiction or a small number of 
jurisdictions. This means that litigators depend for their fee 
revenue on the business of the local courts. If the local courts 
remain idle, the income of litigators declines. This explains 
why lawyers in general, and those working in litigation 
departments in particular, have a strong interest in keeping 
their courts busy. In a legal environment that allows the 
disputants to opt out of a particular jurisdiction through a 
forum selection or arbitration clause, lawyers cannot force 
contracting parties into their courts. Rather, they must see 
to it that the local courts are attractive enough not to drive 
parties away and even to attract more litigants. But why 
  
 112. For an overview, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 89, at 716-
20. For a more elaborate treatment, see ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTION 15-78 (2000). 
 113. See supra Part III.D. 
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should a legislature accommodate this concern? Part of the 
answer lies in the fact that legal work is a professional 
service that generates substantial revenues for local 
suppliers. Lawmakers have an interest in keeping those 
revenues within “their” economy, and to export them by 
attracting demand from elsewhere. The well-being and 
growth of the legal industry keeps voters working in law 
firms happy, it has positive spill-over effects for other local 
suppliers such as restaurants and hotels, but also for sellers 
of real estate and office space, and it contributes directly to 
the public budget in the form of tax revenues.  
In addition to these beneficial effects for the local 
economy, there is also a public-choice story to be told, as 
lawyers are a small group with well-aligned and well-defined 
interests that have proven to be more successful in the 
political arena than large groups with conflicting and ill-
defined interests.114 This effect is particularly pronounced in 
the case of attorneys because they tend to control the 
legislature’s judicial committee, where the important 
decisions in matters relating to legal services are made. 
There is empirical evidence that litigators have indeed 
managed to voice their interests quite powerfully and to 
advertise their domestic justice system as particularly 
“competitive.”115  
4. Arbitrators, Arbitration Institutions, and the 
Framers of Arbitration Acts 
Arbitration is an easy case for competition in the market 
for dispute resolution services because the supply side is 
composed of self-interested individuals and institutions that 
offer their services on a private market.116 In analyzing the 
supply side of the market for arbitration it is important not 
  
 114. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (1965). 
 115. THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: 
JURISDICTION OF CHOICE (2007), sponsored by the law firms of Herbert Smith, 
Norton Rose and Eversheds, available at https://www.haitz-
rechtsanwaelte.de/de/newsarchiv/data/aktuelles__4_2.pdf.  
 116. Cf. Peter B. Rutlege, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral 
Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151, 161-65 (2004) (“These markets for dispute 
resolution services (both domestic and international) are marked by fierce 
competition among suppliers.”). 
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to focus exclusively on the arbitrators as individuals and to 
view them as the only competitors of judges sitting in courts 
of law. Rather, the market for arbitration includes arbitral 
institutions that offer the service of administering arbitral 
proceedings and serve as intermediaries between the 
disputants and individual arbitrators ready to accept 
appointments to tribunals. A recent empirical survey has 
found that 86% of the awards rendered by arbitral tribunals 
were made within proceedings administered by an 
arbitration institution, while the remaining 14% were 
rendered in ad hoc arbitrations which involve no institution 
but only a freelance tribunal.117 Thus, one must expect 
competition to unfold on three dimensions, namely between 
individual arbitrators, between arbitration institutions, and 
finally between the world of arbitration (i.e. institutions and 
individuals taken together on the one side) and the public 
courts whose jurisdiction may be derogated on the other.  
Any doubts that competition between arbitral 
institutions such as the AAA,118 JAMS,119 ICC,120 and LCIA121 
actually exists are immediately dispelled by a glance at their 
websites where the institutions advertise their services in 
the same manner as other profit-making organizations do.122 
Intensive competition characterizes the market for 
individual arbitrators too. Practitioners and academics alike 
compete for lucrative appointments in the arbitration market 
by participating in conferences, publishing books and articles 
  
 117. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE 
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 15 (Queen Mary Univ. of London, ed. 2008), available 
at http://pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf. 
 118. American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org (last visited Aug. 28, 
2014). 
 119. The registered name is “JAMS—The Resolution Experts.” Originally, 
JAMS was an acronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation services. See 
http://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). 
 120. International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). 
 121. The London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia.org (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2014). 
 122. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 117, at 15 (listing the shares 
of the different arbitration institutions of the global market of international 
arbitration). 
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on arbitration, and trying to build up a reputation by serving 
on tribunals in a way that they hope the parties will 
appreciate.123  
There is also evidence of competition between 
jurisdictions to attract arbitral proceedings, i.e. arbitrations 
that are conducted in one particular jurisdiction rather than 
another.124 It is no secret that the major jurisdictions serving 
as seats for international arbitrations, particularly England, 
France, and Switzerland, are eager to outperform each other. 
To this end, none of the “big three” resolved to adopt 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration,125 as such a move would bite off any competitive 
edge that the English, French or Swiss laws of arbitration 
may have, or be perceived to have, over their competitors. 
France and Switzerland even went as far as to enact special 
rules for international arbitrations, which differ from the 
legal framework that applies to arbitrating domestic 
disputes.126 The separation of the law of arbitration into two 
distinct areas carries the respective legislature’s intention of 
attracting international arbitrations on its face.  
  
 123. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of 
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52 (1999).  
 124. KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 6 (1993); 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitrator Selection and Regulatory Competition in 
International Arbitration Law, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 167, 174 (Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); Christopher R. Drahozal, Regulatory 
Competition and the Location of International Arbitration Proceedings, 24 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 371, 373 (2004).  
 125. United Nations, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (1994), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf. 
 126. The motives underlying this split are rarely explained in public. Cf. JEAN-
FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIAN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, 25-28 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2007).  
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C. Evidence of Competition Between Adjudication and 
Arbitration 
1. Claims and Empirical Findings 
Within the literature on arbitration, it is commonly 
taken for granted that arbitration clauses are a staple in 
commercial contracts and that hardly any business makes do 
without them.127 This claim must be too strong, however, as 
it cannot explain why courts are still busy resolving 
commercial cases. The proposition that arbitration is 
superior to litigation is impossible to confirm or refute, as 
empirical research is particularly difficult in this area. Even 
though arbitral institutions publish statistics, these do not 
include the number of ad-hoc arbitrations that remain in the 
dark. In addition, knowledge of the number of cases resolved 
in arbitration has little informational value as long as the 
total number of disputes, including those that are never filed 
with a court or arbitral institution, but are resolved by way 
of negotiation, mediation, and other forms of alternative 
dispute resolution, remains unknown.128  
These cautionary remarks are confirmed by a recent 
empirical survey conducted by Eisenberg and Miller of 
contracts filed with the SEC. Their research revealed that 
only 20% of international contracts, and no more than 11% of 
domestic contracts, included arbitration clauses.129 A 
European study on the choice of dispute resolution 
  
 127. Cf. REDFERN & HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ¶ 1.01 (5th ed. 
2009) (“International Arbitration has become the principal method of resolving 
disputes between States, individuals, and corporations in almost every aspect of 
international trade, commerce, and investment.”).  
 128. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of 
Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 291, 
294-95 (2006).  
 129. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held 
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight 
from Arbitration]. For a critique of this study, arguing that the flight from 
arbitration does not happen, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, 
Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 433, 446-76 (2010). 
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mechanisms in cross-border transactions based on telephone 
interviews with one hundred businesses suggests that, in 
Europe, the demand for arbitration is higher. 63% of 
respondents said that they preferred arbitration to litigation 
in court.130  
These findings should not come as a surprise. As has 
been explored above, the choice between different 
mechanisms of dispute resolution involves a range of complex 
variables. In making the choice between arbitration and 
litigation, the parties must compare the efficiency gains from 
the accurate enforcement of the incentive structure set up in 
their contract with the sum of administrative costs, losses 
from delay, collateral harm with respect to both, and the 
performance of a hypothetical tribunal and of the competent 
court. The better the performance of the judicial system 
within the dimensions of accuracy, administrative cost, 
delay, and collateral harm, the more favorably it compares to 
arbitration. Given the variation between jurisdictions, it 
would be surprising if the results were homogenous. 
2. International Arbitration 
The empirical study cited above confirms the unanimous 
view that arbitration clauses are more popular in 
international transactions than in domestic ones.131 Parties 
are averse to litigating in the courts of their respective 
opponents for fear of judicial bias132 and in order to avoid the 
use of a foreign language, the retention of foreign counsel, 
and many other inconveniences that reduce the party’s 
chance of winning in a foreign court. In the international 
context, arbitration is the only way to secure a truly neutral 
decision-maker and to thus provide for accuracy in decision-
  
 130. STEFAN VOGENAUER & CHRISTOPHER HODGES, CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN 
EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF CONTRACT LAW 45 
(2008), available at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/Oxford%20Civil%
20Justice%20Survey%20-%20Summary%20of%20Results,%20Final.pdf. 
 131. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 129, at 341-42. 
 132. See supra Part III.D.1. But see Eisenberg & Miller, Flight from Arbitration, 
supra note 129, at 341-42 (doubting that any such bias exists in American courts).  
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making and the resulting incentives for welfare-enhancing 
behavior.  
A related point that has already been mentioned is the 
privilege arbitral awards enjoy in the area of cross-border 
enforcement.133 Even if one compares international 
arbitration to litigation in the best public court available in 
terms of even-handedness and accuracy, arbitration has an 
inherent advantage, as arbitral awards are easily enforceable 
across borders under the New York Convention, whereas 
judgments of public courts are not.  
3. Domestic Arbitration 
Within the context of domestic disputes, enforceability of 
judicial decisions is assured, and the need to avoid a biased 
or even hostile decision-maker is much weaker. But still, a 
substantial number of disputants choose arbitration. In some 
jurisdictions, arbitration has become a thorn in the side of 
the public court system so that judges and lawmakers engage 
in reforms in order to regain market share. Explaining what 
particular features of the domestic litigation system the 
parties seek to contract out of is anything but easy, and the 
answer will vary across jurisdictions. With regard to the 
American market,134 however, arbitration promises some 
additional advantages it misses elsewhere, namely of 
foreclosing class actions,135 of curtailing discovery,136 and of 
getting rid of juries as decision-makers.137  
  
 133. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 134. See, e.g., the RAND study by DOUGLAS SHONZ ET AL., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (2011). 
 135. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). As to New 
York law, see Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 2003). 
Christopher Drahozal and Stephen Ware found that “all of the arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts (20 of 20, or 100%) contained a class arbitration waiver.” 
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 444. 
 136. As to the limits, see Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
 137. See SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 15-16; Drahozal, Unfair Clauses, supra 
note 90, 710-12.  
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Beyond these special features, a strong factor weighing 
in favor of arbitration as compared to litigation is 
confidentiality.138 Proceedings in public court are just that— 
open to the public—so that third parties and journalists have 
a right to attend and observe them and to inform the public 
accordingly. In contrast, arbitral proceedings are typically 
kept private so that no one apart from the parties, their 
advisors, and the arbitrators, obtain knowledge of the facts 
disclosed and discussed in the course of the proceedings. The 
arbitration rules of many institutions impose additional 
duties of confidentiality on parties, counsel, and 
arbitrators.139 Together, these rules foreclose the most 
important source of collateral harm that the parties might 
otherwise suffer in the process of dispute resolution.140  
A second advantage of domestic arbitration as compared 
to litigation is the right to choose the decision-makers in 
person, rather than choosing a court as an institution.141 In 
the selection process, they may consider a range of concerns, 
such as their preference for a lawyer familiar with the legal 
issues raised by the particular case, or for an industry 
insider, or the desire to sidestep strict legal analysis by 
  
 138. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 18-19. 
 139. Rule 23 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R23 (“The arbitrator and the AAA shall 
maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary . . . It 
shall be discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the 
attendance of any other person other than a party and its representatives.”); Rule 
26 JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules (“JAMS and the 
Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding 
and the Award, including the Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a 
judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award, or unless otherwise required by 
law or judicial decision . . . The Arbitrator may exclude any non-Party from any 
part of a Hearing.”); Art. 26 (3) ICC Arbitration and ADR Rules, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org (“Save with the approval of the arbitral tribunal and the 
parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted.”). Art. 22 
(3) ICC Arbitration Rules adds that “the arbitral tribunal may make orders 
concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or of any other 
matters in connection with the arbitration and may take measures for protecting 
trade secrets and confidential information.” 
 140. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 141. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 16-17. 
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avoiding the involvement of lawyers as arbitrators. The 
opportunity to choose the decision-maker promotes the joint 
interest in accuracy, in the sense of enforcement of the 
incentive scheme set up by the parties in their contract.142  
Still, the advantage of arbitration in terms of accuracy is 
not beyond doubt. It has been suggested that arbitrators are 
reluctant to actually decide cases on the merits and to stick 
faithfully to the contract they are called upon to enforce.143 
They may have an incentive to seek compromises by entering 
quasi-Solomonic awards—that do no more than splitting the 
difference—because they want to avoid antagonizing one of 
the parties. Disappointing one of the disputants by entering 
a clear-cut decision against it may cause this party to resist 
that decision-maker’s future appointments as arbitrator in 
other cases. Because arbitrators depend on future business, 
they will want to avoid such an outcome. Plausible as this 
theory may sound, it seems difficult to accept that potential 
disputants share the interest in clear-cut decisions reached 
under a resolute application of the relevant contractual and 
legal rules ex ante, but forget about this preference ex post 
and sanction arbitrators who live up to this interest by 
refusing their reappointment.144  
The other concerns that are frequently put forward to 
explain the attractiveness of arbitration—savings in costs 
and time—turn out to be weak upon closer inspection.145 As 
far as costs are concerned, much depends on the court system 
that arbitration is compared to. In any case, the fees charged 
by three self-employed professionals serving as arbitrators 
will almost always be higher than the fees charged by a court 
subsidized by the public. Whether it is possible to make up 
this structural disadvantage by getting rid of the costly 
  
 142. See supra Part IV.A.1.3. 
 143. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 11-12; Brunet, supra note 123, at 42-47.  
 144. Cf. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split 
the Baby”—Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. 
INT’L ARB. 573 (2001). The RAND study found that corporate counsel thought that 
arbitrators tended to come out in the middle even though the data gathered from 
a sample of arbitral awards did not support this fear. Cf. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 
134, at 11-12. 
 145. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 447-49. 
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appeals processes available in the public system will depend 
on the individual case. The same reasoning is more or less 
true for the alleged advantage in delay. Arbitral proceedings 
may drag on for a long time as it is necessary to coordinate 
the calendars of at least five professional lawyers, i.e. the two 
attorneys representing the parties plus the three lawyers 
serving as arbitrators. In addition, much depends on the 
particular procedure that is chosen in arbitration. While 
trade association arbitration follows a no-frills approach that 
streamlines procedures, focuses on documents, and dispenses 
with discovery,146 arbitration of international commercial 
disputes resembles litigation in court more and more. In as 
much as arbitration assumes the style of litigation, the 
potential for substantial savings in cost and time is lost.147  
In summary, the advantages of arbitration as compared 
to litigation in public court in the domestic context come in 
the form of reduced administrative costs, less collateral harm 
thanks to confidentiality, and greater accuracy. These 
conclusions were confirmed by the above-cited survey of 
European businesses. Even though the study was premised 
exclusively on cross-border transactions, 63% of respondents 
said that they preferred arbitration because of 
confidentiality, 21% because of speed, and 3% because of 
costs.148  
D. Evidence of Competition Between Civil Justice Systems 
Western systems of civil procedure acknowledge and 
protect the freedom of the parties to vest jurisdiction in the 
court of their choice.149 In practice, many parties make use of 
  
 146. See Brunet, supra note 123, at 51-61. 
 147. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 6-7, 11-20 (2010); see also Richard Chernick et al., The Future of 
Commercial Arbitration, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 415, 416-22 (2009).  
 148. VOGENAUER & HODGES, supra note 130, at 46.  
 149. Compare Council Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012, art. 25, 
2012 O.J. (L 351) (providing for strict enforcement of forum-selection clauses, 
provided that certain formal requirements have been complied with), with 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991), and M/S Bremen 
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (providing examples of American courts 
enforcing forum-selection clauses). 
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this freedom, as forum selection clauses are a staple in 
international and domestic transactions. The question is 
whether the parties, in ascribing jurisdiction, act on the 
preferences identified above, i.e. that they search for a forum 
that offers the best balance of accuracy and costs. There is 
empirical evidence suggesting that this is in fact the case.  
A recent survey by Eisenberg and Miller of contracts filed 
with the SEC in connection with “current reports” involved 
no less than 2,865 contracts of different variety that were 
analyzed with regard to their choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses.150 The authors found that the correlation 
between the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law decision was 
close to perfect, i.e. 100%.151 The fact that the parties align 
their choice-of-law and choice-of-forum decisions supports 
the proposition that they search for the optimal mix of 
accuracy in adjudication and litigation costs. It is fair to 
assume that the court sitting in the jurisdiction, the law of 
which was chosen, is in the best position to apply that law 
accurately, and at low cost, as its judges are the ones with 
the greatest proficiency in the applicable law. For this 
reason, the best option the parties have is to vest jurisdiction 
in the courts of the state whose law they choose.  
As to the choice between jurisdictions, the study revealed 
that New York law was chosen in 46% of all contracts,152 and 
that 41% of the contracts containing a forum-selection clause 
designated the New York courts.153 The dominance of New 
York as a venue for commercial litigation is not the result of 
happenstance but rather the product of many factors, which 
are similar to those that made London, Paris, Zurich, and 
Geneva popular locations for international arbitrations.154 As 
the commercial capital of the U.S. and host to the nation’s 
leading law firms, New York City is a natural pick for 
corporate executives and their advisors, if only for its 
  
 150. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1487-89. 
 151. Id. at 1506. 
 152. The rate was even higher if merger contracts were excluded with their 
disproportionate share of clauses invoking Delaware law. Id. at 1489-92. 
 153. Id. at 1504. 
 154. See infra Part V.A. 
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proximity.155 For this reason, New York’s courts were able to 
develop skills and gain experience in the resolution of 
commercial disputes that attracted even more business.156  
The judges and lawmakers in the State of New York 
contributed their own share in making the city the preferred 
venue for business litigation. The most important policy 
choices made in New York to strengthen the jurisdiction as a 
venue for the resolution of commercial disputes was to honor 
choice of law and forum selection clauses as long as they 
remain within the bounds set by the exceptions of public 
policy and fraud in the inducement, which in turn are 
construed narrowly and applied with great care.157 
On top of that, in the course of the 1990s, New York 
created the Commercial Division of its Supreme Court, first 
in New York County and later in other districts of the state. 
The idea behind this initiative was to offer high-quality 
judicial services for the resolution of high-stakes commercial 
cases in an effort to attract more such business to the state. 
Today, the Commercial Division advertises its services in a 
similar manner to private arbitration institutions.158 In the 
judgment of the legal community in New York, the 
Commercial Division manages to live up to this self-
description, as it is regarded as an “unqualified success.”159  
  
 155. For a full development of the “New York Hypothesis,” see Eisenberg & 
Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1481-87. 
 156. As to network effects, see infra, Part V.A. 
 157. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2080-92 (2009). 
 158. Commercial Division N.Y. Supreme Court, History, http://nycourts.gov/
courts/comdiv/history.shtml (“The Commercial Division serves as a forum for 
resolution of complicated commercial disputes. Successful resolution of these 
disputes requires particular expertise across the broad and complex expanse of 
commercial law. . . . The caseload of the Division is thus very demanding, 
requiring of the court scholarship in commercial law, experience in the 
management of complex cases, and a wealth of energy. The Commercial Division 
has actively sought to employ advanced technology to assist in handling its 
caseload effectively.”). 
 159. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and 
Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAWYER 147, 158 
(2004) (quoting Tamara Loomis, Commercial Division: High-Profile Case Casts 
Spotlight on Well-Regarded Court, N.Y.L.J. June 20, 2002, at 5). 
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E. Is Bilateral Competition Desirable? 
1. Accuracy of Adjudication Promotes Social Welfare 
The question remains whether competition between the 
courts of different jurisdictions, as well as between judicial 
and arbitral resolution of disputes, promotes social welfare. 
With regard to unilateral choice of forum the answer has 
been in the negative.160 Bilateral competition is different. 
Rational parties are interested in maximizing the pie 
through the choice of efficient contract terms and default 
rules. For the incentive schemes set up by the parties and the 
lawmakers to work, there must be an enforcement 
mechanism that sanctions non-compliance, but leaves 
compliant parties alone. In fact, the law and economics 
literature always assumes, without saying so, that the 
efficient incentive scheme set up by the substantive law or 
the parties’ agreement is enforced accurately in cases of non-
compliance. More precisely, for the incentive schemes of the 
substantive law to work, there must be a procedural 
mechanism that sanctions offenders and spares innocent 
parties.161  
On this view, society at large is nothing but a large group 
of potential litigants. In parallel to the two parties to a 
contract, rational members of society would choose the court 
that promises to enforce efficient contracts and efficient legal 
rules accurately, subject to cost. The parties’ incentives to 
choose an accurate court are congruent with the social 
interest in courts that minimize the costs of error.162  
2. A Race to the Top 
If it is true that the parties jointly prefer courts and 
tribunals that render accurate decisions, more precisely, that 
balance accuracy and costs in an optimal way, and that 
arbitrators, judges and lawmakers respond to this demand, 
then bilateral competition results in a race to the top. 
Bilateral competition creates incentives for the decision-
  
 160. See supra Part III.F. 
 161. See supra Part IV.A.1.  
 162. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103. 
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makers in the judicial systems and in arbitral institutions to 
improve accuracy up to the point where further advances 
come at a cost that outweighs the benefits. The result is a 
dynamic process that favors those courts and institutions 
that are best in balancing accuracy and costs and that are 
most responsive to whatever other preferences the parties 
might have jointly. While unilateral competition imposes 
costs on society, bilateral competition promotes welfare.  
3. Efficient Courts and Inefficient Law 
The proposition that accuracy in adjudication promotes 
social welfare only holds true if the substantive law 
governing the subject matter of the dispute promotes social 
welfare too. The private interest in accuracy maps on to the 
corresponding social interest only if the contract that stands 
to be enforced is itself efficient. On the assumption that the 
parties wrote a contract that maximizes social welfare, the 
accurate enforcement of such a contract maximizes social 
welfare as well. It is generally assumed that the parties write 
efficient contracts, but not all disputes involve contractual 
obligations. Where the suit is based on tort or some other 
statutory or judge-made rule of non-contractual liability, 
accuracy in dispute resolution contributes to social welfare 
only if the rule itself is efficient. The meticulous enforcement 
of an inefficient rule does not promote social welfare but does 
just the opposite.  
If the assumption of efficient substantive rules is relaxed, 
matters become more complicated. Where the parties are 
authorized to contract around the inefficient rule, they will 
do so and search for a court that promises to accurately 
implement their agreement instead of the legal rule. Where 
the inefficient substantive rule is mandatory, the parties will 
be lost in public court, regardless of the forum they happen 
to choose. However, they might still be able to get away with 
a contractual derogation from the inefficient rule if they find 
a decision-maker willing to enforce their bargain. Arbitrators 
may be prepared to do just that in an effort to compete away 
business from the courts.  
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V.  IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFICIENT MARKETS IN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
A. Network Effects 
The evidence from the world of international arbitration 
as well as from the litigation market within the United 
States suggests that the race to the top is seriously delayed 
by network effects that help established jurisdictions to 
defend their advantage, even if outperformed by other, less-
established ones.163 Network externalities explain why 
markets for consumer electronic appliances such as personal 
computers, DVD-players, and smart phones tend to gravitate 
towards a small number of technological standards, or even 
a single one. In essence, the more consumers become 
members of a community of users of a particular product 
standard, the more valuable such products become for all the 
members of the community. With the presence of network 
effects, markets are subject to first-mover and lock-in effects. 
Firms that are successful in establishing a network of users 
may defend their position much more easily than they would 
otherwise because their customers face substantial costs of 
switching to another product-standard, even if the latter is 
superior.  
The same forces operating with regard to certain 
products that cause the market to gravitate towards a small 
number of technological standards have been shown to be at 
work in the market for corporate charters, where the 
persistent domination of Delaware is best explained by the 
first-mover advantage.164 Contract terms are another 
  
 163. See supra Part IV.D. 
 164. For a historical account of the development leading to the dominance of 
Delaware replacing New Jersey as the front runner in the charter business 
market, see Cary, supra note 17, at 664-65; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuck, 
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. R. 1437, 1443 (1992); David Charny, Competition 
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American 
Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities, 32 HARV. 
INT’L. L.J. 423, 427-28 (1991); Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal 
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 
213-14 (2006). 
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“product” that is susceptible to network effects.165 The more 
parties use a particular system of contract law, the greater 
the system’s utility for the users. However, the additional 
utility generated by a popular system of contract law is not 
generated by abstract legal rules, but by the day-to-day work 
of courts and commentators.166 Where contracts made under 
a particular law are plenty, disputes will tend to be numerous 
too, so that the courts find enough cases to apply, clarify, and 
amplify abstract legal standards. The legal profession 
collaborates with the courts in this enterprise, and gains in 
expertise and experience as well.  
What is true for contract terms is also true for arbitration 
and adjudication. In fact, contract terms and judicial dispute 
resolution are bundled together, as the precise meaning and 
validity of contract terms and default rules cannot be 
determined without reference to case law developed by the 
courts.167 Rational parties interested in accurate enforcement 
of their bargain are well-advised to select the dispute 
resolution mechanism and the applicable law in tandem, as 
a package, rather than one after another. As empirical 
studies have revealed, choice of law and choice of forum are 
bundled together so that everything that has been said with 
regard to the choice of contract terms also applies to the 
choice of judicial services.168  
As a consequence, the market for judicial services will be 
haunted by network effects as well. The history of the 
business courts in the United States provides an example as 
it suggests that the market for high-quality judicial services 
is subject to serious first-mover effects.169 Even though the 
example of New York was copied by many other states, these 
“subsequent movers” never managed to break the dominance 
  
 165. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of 
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774-89 (1995). 
 166. Id. at 775-79, 782-84 (detailing “interpretive network externalities” and 
“legal services network externalities,” respectively). 
 167. See supra Part IV.D. 
 168. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra, note 10, at 1487-89, 
1509-10. 
 169. For a brief history of New York’s Commercial Division, see Commercial 
Division N.Y. Supreme Court, supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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of New York.170 The same is true in the market for 
international arbitrations that is dominated by a small set of 
well-established venues, i.e. Zurich, Geneva, Paris, and 
London.171 It takes time and persistent diligence to build up 
a reputation for excellence in business litigation and in the 
support of international arbitral proceedings. The better the 
quality of the law, the richer the case law interpreting and 
applying the substantive and procedural rules; and the 
broader the experience of the courts, the more attractive a 
jurisdiction becomes as the preferred venue for business 
litigation, commercial arbitration, or incorporation of 
companies. Once a jurisdiction and its courts have gained an 
edge over competitors, it becomes extremely difficult for the 
latter to catch up and to lure litigants into their own courts 
and arbitration venues.  
If network effects do exist in the market for dispute 
resolution, then the conclusion that competition in this 
market will result in a race to the top must be qualified. The 
first-mover and lock-in effects prevent the actors on the 
demand side of the market, i.e. the parties seeking dispute 
resolution services, from selecting offers which are superior 
to the established ones on a stand-alone basis, but lack the 
positive network effects that come with an entrenched 
market position.172 As a consequence, well-established 
jurisdictions may be able to defend their position and 
continue dominating the market even though they are well 
off the mark, i.e. fail to satisfy the parties’ preferences to the 
greatest extent at least cost.  
B. Agency Problems 
1. Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses 
The preceding analysis was premised on the parameters 
that rational parties use in making the choice between 
different mechanisms or institutions of dispute resolution 
such as courts and arbitral tribunals. In reality, however, it 
  
 170. For an overview of the landscape of the business courts, see Bach & 
Applebaum, supra note 159, at 160-228. 
 171. See supra Part IV.D. 
 172. Klausner, supra note 165, at 789-825. 
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is a rare exception that the parties negotiate and agree on a 
dispute resolution clause in person. In real-world 
transactions, at least the technical provisions of contracts are 
normally drafted and negotiated by attorneys, not by the 
parties themselves. More sophisticated parties will take an 
interest even in these clauses and probably bring in-house 
counsel to the negotiating table in order to oversee the 
process, but this is only done where the stakes are high. In 
the remaining cases, the attorney remains in charge and 
advises the client about the perceived benefits and costs of 
one option or another. 
2. Lawyers as Agents of Their Clients  
It is received wisdom that the relationship between the 
client and his lawyer creates a principal-agent problem.173 
The incentives of lawyer and client are not identical as the 
lawyer has an interest in maximizing her income from fees, 
whereas the client is interested in maximizing the balance of 
the sum received on his claim in settlement or upon litigation 
minus the costs involved in the process, including the fees 
charged by his lawyer. In addition, the lawyer, as the agent, 
enjoys an informational advantage over her client with 
regard to the legal issues involved, including the parameters 
that should enter the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum 
decisions to be made by the client. Thus, the client is unable 
to fully observe his lawyer and to sanction deviations from 
the course of action that is in his best interest, and the lawyer 
is in a position to exploit her client. The distortion of the 
lawyer’s incentives and the resultant losses to the client have 
been explored at length with regard to areas such as 
remuneration of lawyers, particularly the choice between 
hourly fees and contingency fees, and the decision to either 
  
 173. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103, at 431-34; Dammann & Hansmann, 
supra note 10, at 17-18; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing 
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 527-29 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Issues in 
Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 189 (1987). 
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settle or litigate.174 In contrast, the principal-agent problems 
involved in the choice of forum or other dispute resolution 
mechanisms have not been the subject of systematic 
exploration as of yet.175  
3. The Choice-of-Forum Decision 
For a self-interested lawyer who wants to maximize fee 
revenue, the overriding objective is to keep herself in 
business and not to lose the client to somebody else. 
Otherwise, there will be no fees to earn at all. The prime 
objective of not losing the client to a competing lawyer would 
be inconsequential if lawyers were admitted in any court 
anywhere, but this is not reality. All over the world, lawyers 
are admitted only in the courts of a particular jurisdiction 
and are thus not authorized to represent the client in courts 
outside of this jurisdiction. Within the U.S., lawyers are 
restricted to the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to 
practice, and while ownership of multiple licenses is possible, 
attorneys practicing in a multitude of states are the 
exception.176 Even absent regulations tying lawyers to 
particular courts and areas, clients are well advised to retain 
the services of local counsel as procedural rules and actual 
court practices vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from 
court to court. It is highly risky and may even amount to 
malpractice if a lawyer represents a client in a court of whose 
routine and procedure she knows nothing about. For these 
reasons, the preference for hometown justice that has been 
identified as an important heuristic in cases of unilateral 
forum choice by rational plaintiffs177 will be much stronger in 
attorneys than in their clients.  
  
 174. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103, at 431-34 (exploring the incentives under 
various billing mechanisms); Miller, supra note 173 (exploring the distortion of 
incentives to settle); cf. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 86, at 435-37. 
 175. See David P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil 
Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 48, at 375-77 
(analysing the choice of law and choice of forum decisions without taking the 
agency problem into account).  
 176. Regarding choice of forum in disputes involving corporate law, cf. Larry E. 
Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
999, 1010-11 (1994). 
 177. See supra Part III.D.1. 
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The fact that lawyers have a strong incentive for 
hometown justice is bad news for competition between 
judicial systems. Even if counsel realizes that an out-of-state 
court is superior to the municipal one, she will resist advising 
the client to take advantage of the foreign court because that 
would involve sending him to a competitor. This pessimistic 
conclusion need not be the end of the story, as the legal 
profession has evolved in ways that mitigate the anti-
competitive tendency of local practice. The emergence and 
growth of large law firms operating nationwide and 
internationally tends to alleviate the preference for 
hometown justice. A law firm that has offices in every major 
jurisdiction need not fear losing the client upon the 
recommendation of turning to a foreign venue. The local 
office at the seat of the optimal court could take over the 
client, and the firm would not lose any revenue.  
Even within firms with offices in many jurisdictions, it 
would be naive to think that the trend towards hometown 
justice simply goes away. Large law firms are anything but a 
family business contributing to a common pool of revenue, 
but are rather a more or less tight band of local offices. There 
definitely remains inter-office competition between local 
offices as well as intra-office competition between partners 
practicing in the same office. As a consequence, a partner 
practicing in jurisdiction A will not feel indifferent about 
losing a client to a colleague practicing in an office of the 
same firm in jurisdiction B, even if the courts in B outperform 
those in A. This may explain the strong demand for 
arbitration in international commercial cases involving 
sophisticated parties. In contrast to litigation in public 
courts, representing a client in arbitration does not require 
that counsel be admitted to the bar at the seat of arbitration. 
Resorting to arbitration enables counsel to correctly advise 
the client to opt out of the local court system without the risk 
of losing him to a competitor.  
C. Externalities 
1. Demonstrating and Developing the Law  
Dispute resolution is not the sole function of judicial 
systems. It is helpful to further differentiate the so-called 
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rulemaking function of the judicial system into two sub-
categories, one being the interpretation and application of 
the law to individual disputes, the second being the 
development of new legal rules. 
The interpretation and application of abstract legal 
norms to specific fact patterns informs the public, including 
potential litigants of the future, about the legal rules, 
standards, and requirements, as they apply to actual 
behavior. The display of the “law in action,” or rather, “the 
law as it applies to individual cases,” to parties in a similar 
position as the current litigants yields important benefits. 
Those parties who are already entangled in a dispute similar 
to the one that was just resolved receive valuable guidance 
as to the prospective outcome of litigation in their own case. 
This enables the parties to form realistic expectations about 
the probabilities of winning or losing, which in turn furthers 
their chances of reaching an amicable settlement. Needless 
to say, early settlement promotes the interests of both the 
litigants and the public, as it helps to save substantial 
resources that would otherwise be spent on litigation.  
Furthermore, publicized decisions of the courts help 
parties who still find themselves in the position ex ante, in 
the course of negotiating their contract, to draft their 
contract in accordance with their preferences. Where the 
court, in a prior judgment, interpreted a default rule, they 
may want to contract around it; where the court interpreted 
contract language, the litigants of the future will know better 
which words and phrases to use and which to avoid. Where 
the subject matter of the prior dispute involved a mandatory 
rule, the parties might want to avoid its application by using 
a different legal framework that does better in translating 
their preferences into a viable legal instrument.  
The benefits just described are not being generated by 
the interpretation and application of the law as such, but by 
its interpretation and application under the eyes of the public 
and by a competent authority. If the courts kept their 
decisions secret, potential disputants would be left without a 
blueprint for the resolution of their disputes and without 
guidance for adjusting their behavior. However, the 
publication of judicial decisions is not the only thing that 
matters; another one is the requirement that they are made 
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by a competent body wielding sovereign power. It does not 
help much if three law professors draw together, form a 
panel, try a case, and then publish their interpretation of the 
law and its application to an individual fact pattern. Private 
judicial bodies lack the power necessary to interpret and 
apply the law with public authority, and are thus unable to 
establish precedent that provides guidance for disputes of the 
future.  
The same considerations also apply to the rulemaking 
function in the narrow and technical sense, i.e. the 
development of the law into new areas not anticipated by the 
courts and lawmakers of the past. Again, any benefits of 
judicial development of the law and the making of new rules 
depend on published legal opinions. Bold decisions would 
remain inconsequential if they were taken privately and 
remained “in camera.”  
2. Externalities of Arbitration 
The fact that the choice of dispute resolution mechanisms 
other than litigation in court may do harm to the 
amplification and rulemaking functions of the courts is well 
known from the interface of litigation and arbitration. One 
striking illustration is the drying up of the stream of court 
decisions in disputes between securities dealers and their 
clients after the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its course in 
the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 
and affirmed the arbitrability of statutory claims arising 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.178 On its face, this 
decision strengthened the role of party autonomy in honoring 
arbitration agreements, but in reality it led to a complete 
shift away from litigation in public court to the benefit of 
arbitration organized by the exchanges or under the auspices 
  
 178. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987). 
The authority of the parties to refer disputes to arbitration includes claims arising 
under the RICO Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2012); Shearson, 482 U.S. at 242; 
Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.). Prior 
decisions held that RICO claims were not arbitrable. S.A. Mineracao da 
Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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of the NASD and, today, of FINRA.179  
With regard to the externality problem, the crucial point 
is not the often-heard criticism that securities arbitration 
disadvantages the “one-shotter” plaintiff to the benefit of the 
repeat player,180 but the dearth of public trials and rulings 
accessible to the public that results from taking whole 
categories of disputes private by way of arbitration. While it 
is true that the NASD and FINRA tried to address this 
concern by requiring that awards be published,181 publication 
is of little value because more than 90% of the awards 
rendered in securities arbitration come without reasons.182 
Arbitral decisions that do not disclose the underlying 
reasoning and that, consequently, do not cite any precedent 
are practically worthless as contributions to the 
amplification and development of the law.183  
The disinterest in reasoned opinions and the avoidance 
of precedent that characterizes securities arbitration does 
not characterize arbitration in general, as arbitral routine in 
other areas may be entirely different. Arbitral tribunals 
dealing with employment disputes routinely provide reasons 
and draw on precedent, primarily in the form of judicial 
  
 179. See William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 75, 105-06 (2002); Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: 
The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1107 
(1993). 
 180. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); cf. Edward Brunet & 
Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 459, 486-91 (2008); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big 
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled 
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60-66 (1997). But see Drahozal, Unfair Clauses, 
supra note 90, at 749-71. 
 181. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (FINRA), CODE OF 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES § 12904(h) (2013) (“All awards 
shall be made publicly available.”). 
 182. Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and 
Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 144 (2005); W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1091, 1104 (2012). 
 183. Brunet & Johnson, supra note 180, at 472-74. 
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decisions, to support their legal conclusions.184 But even then, 
the decision of an arbitral tribunal is not the same as a 
judgment of a court of law.185 It cannot be challenged on 
appeal, so that decisions of intermediate courts of appeal that 
may serve as a laboratory for testing the available options 
and supporting arguments never happen. On the assumption 
that the appeals process is not a legal nicety, but an effort not 
only in improving accuracy of decision-making but also at 
amplifying and developing the law at least cost,186 an arbitral 
system of dispute resolution misses out entirely. The point is 
not that arbitrators do worse than courts of first instance or 
even appellate judges. If they were, the parties would be ill-
advised to contract out of the court system in favor of 
arbitration and one could trust that, over time, the parties 
would remedy the problem and come back to the judicial 
system. The point is rather that the parties choose a dispute 
resolution mechanism that may be good for them 
individually, without taking account of the interest of the 
general public, i.e. future litigants, in authoritative 
interpretation and application, as well as the development of 
the law.187 The arbitrators and the parties who have to pay 
for their services take a free ride on the efforts of the public 
courts to interpret, amplify, and develop the law.  
The free-riding of the parties to arbitral proceedings on 
the public court system is rather harmless as long as there is 
a constant stream of judicial opinions. Obviously, not only 
money but also court decisions are subject to the law of 
decreasing marginal utility. If a judicial system decides a few 
thousand civil cases per year, society can easily dispense with 
a dozen, a hundred, or even a thousand cases that go to 
arbitration. But this is true only if these cases are drawn 
more or less at random from the pool of all disputes so that 
the courts still see cases of all varieties. Problems arise if 
arbitration is so pervasive in one particular area that there 
  
 184. Weidemaier, supra note 182, at 1111-24.  
 185. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895, 1947-49, 1952 (2010). 
 186. See Shavell, Error Correction, supra note 96, at 415-17. 
 187. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 248-49; Shavell, Error Correction, 
supra note 96, at 424. 
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are no more court decisions to guide arbitral decision making 
at all. In the U.S., this has been the outcome in the area of 
securities litigation against brokers, but also with regard to 
some types of consumer transactions where arbitration has 
become de-facto mandatory.188  
3. Opting into the Court System of Another 
Jurisdiction 
The frustration of the rule-demonstration and rule-
making functions of judicial dispute resolution is not limited 
to agreements steering cases away from the courts and 
towards arbitral tribunals. The same problem may arise 
where the parties opt out of the court system of one 
jurisdiction and into the judicial system of another.189 To the 
extent that the prorogated court applies the law of another 
jurisdiction rather than its own, its decision will not count as 
precedent in the courts of the derogated jurisdiction. But 
even if this were otherwise and the judges in the derogated 
jurisdiction paid attention to the rulings of their brothers and 
sisters abroad, the judges of the prorogated court have little 
incentive to invest their scarce resources in terms of time and 
energy into the amplification and the development of foreign 
law. It is received wisdom that the quality of judicial 
decisions made under foreign law is not the same as the one 
of decisions applying the lex fori.190 The courts of the 
derogated jurisdiction, in turn, accord no precedential, or 
even persuasive, value to decisions reached in other 
jurisdictions. 
There is an obvious way to circumvent all these concerns, 
and that is to realign forum selection and choice of law by 
opting into the substantive law of the same jurisdiction that 
also hosts the forum. The court will then apply its own law 
  
 188. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,1638 (2005). 
 189. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 10, at 18-20. 
 190. Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice of Law, in 257 COLLECTED COURSES OF 
THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223, 316-28 (1997). 
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with the same diligence and care as in purely domestic cases, 
and the precedential value of the decision that is ultimately 
reached is out of the question. In fact, empirical studies have 
shown that most parties make forum selection decisions that 
map onto their choice of law decisions.191 In theory, one could 
imagine an outcome where the parties escape from an 
individual jurisdiction in large numbers, choosing foreign law 
and selecting the respective court system so that the courts 
in the derogated jurisdiction are rendered idle.  
Such a scenario would create problems for both 
jurisdictions. The winning jurisdiction that attracts all the 
additional business from abroad will suffer from a winner’s 
curse of a special variety as the perceived advantage of 
judicial services will clog its courts and delay the resolution 
of the disputes brought by its own citizens and taxpayers. 
The host jurisdiction would be forced to counteract this effect 
by raising court fees to the level necessary to cover costs or to 
adopt a split fee system; one for domestic and international 
transactions involving at least one of its own citizens and 
another schedule with elevated fees for cases between two 
foreign parties.192 The net effect for the host jurisdiction will 
still be positive since importing disputes from abroad 
amounts to an export of legal services that creates local 
revenue and contributes to the public purse through sales 
and income taxes. 
Even if the balance for the host jurisdiction may remain 
positive, the net effect for the derogated jurisdiction is 
necessarily, and unavoidably, negative. On the realistic 
assumption that citizens turning to foreign courts are forced 
to solicit the services of the bar in the country of destination, 
the flight from one jurisdiction amounts to an import of legal 
services that must be compensated for by exports of other 
goods and services. Furthermore, a jurisdiction that lost its 
judicial business to a competitor would cut off the stream of 
judicial decisions that illustrate, amplify, and develop the 
law. It would abdicate essential parts of its sovereign power 
to another jurisdiction that gained the upper hand in the 
  
 191. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1487-90. 
 192. This option is explored and embraced by Dammann & Hansmann, supra 
note 10, at 59-69. It must be noted that there are serious constitutional 
restrictions that may destroy the proposal of differentiated court fees. 
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development of the law governing private transactions. On 
the assumption that state law is shaped by the preferences of 
the respective constituency, these preferences would be 
frustrated.  
VI.  THE CHOICE BETWEEN UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL 
COMPETITION 
The preceding analysis of competition of judicial systems 
has led to split results: while unilateral competition of 
plaintiffs for a favorable court will instigate a race to the 
bottom, bilateral competition of both parties for an optimal 
court rather suggests a race to the top that offers the best 
tradeoff of accuracy and costs. The forces created by the two 
kinds of competition are not congruent; rather, they pull in 
opposite directions. While the unilateral demand of plaintiffs 
leads courts to adopt ever more expansive rules of 
jurisdiction and fact-gathering, and ever more victim-
friendly rules on choice of law, aggregation of claims, and 
liability to the detriment of defendants based outside of the 
jurisdiction, bilateral competition creates incentives to 
accurately enforce the bargain made by the parties, as well 
as to implement efficient rules of law. It seems that 
jurisdictions must make a choice whether they want to 
compete on one dimension or the other, as an open heart for 
plaintiffs is at odds with striving for accuracy. Lawmakers 
and judges need to decide whether to afford plaintiffs ever 
more generous protection or whether to strictly enforce the 
contracts made by the parties and efficient rules of law that 
apply to the facts of the case at hand.  
Against this background, it comes as a surprise that the 
empirical findings of Eisenberg and Miller on the most 
popular venues for business litigation are contradicting the 
ranking of state liability systems by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.193 In this survey, New York performs poorly, 
occupying the twenty-third rank among the states,194 while it 
  
 193. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1500. 
 194. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2010 STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING 
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http://court.state.de.us/Superior/pdf/harris_2010.pdf. 
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was identified as the preferred venue for commercial 
litigation in the U.S.195 How can that be? The fact that New 
York performed so well in Eisenberg and Miller’s study and 
so poorly in the eyes of the Chamber of Commerce suggests 
that one of studies must have gotten it wrong. If jurisdictions 
must make a choice whether to engage in unilateral 
competition for more claims or in bilateral competition for 
better outcomes, one would expect that New York ranked 
first, or last, or occupied whatever rank in between, as long 
as it was the same in both studies.  
However, there might be an explanation for the opposite 
findings that is consistent with the empirical findings of both 
surveys. The source of the conflict seems to be that the 
Eisenberg and Miller study focused on conflicts that grew out 
of commercial contracts,196 while the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s ranking is based on the full range of disputes, 
prominently including suits for damages in personal injury 
cases, class actions, and mass torts.197 As a top priority for 
state legislatures, the Chamber’s study nominates tort 
reform and caps on damages—two topics that are close to 
irrelevant for commercial litigation.198 It may well be that 
New York, by creating the Commercial Division of its 
Supreme Court, managed to set contract litigation apart from 
other disputes in general, and from tort litigation in 
particular. If this were true, the state managed to compete 
on two fronts at the same time, namely for tort plaintiffs who 
make the unilateral decision in favor of a friendly forum, and 
for commercial parties negotiating a forum selection clause 
in search of a court that strikes the optimal balance between 
accuracy and costs. 
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